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MONEYBALL SENTENCING
DAWINDER S. SIDHU *
Abstract: Sentencing is a backward- and forward-looking enterprise. That is, sentencing is informed by an individual’s past conduct as well as by the criminal justice system’s prediction of the individual’s future criminal conduct. Increasingly,
the criminal justice system is making these predictions on an actuarial basis,
computing the individual’s risk of recidivism according to the rates of recidivism
for people possessing the same group characteristics (e.g., race, sex, socioeconomic status, education). The sentencing community is drawn to this statistical technique because it purportedly distinguishes with greater accuracy the highrisk from the low-risk, and thereby allows for a more efficient allocation of sentencing resources, reserving incarceration for the truly dangerous and saving the
low-risk from needless penal attention. Despite these asserted benefits, riskassessment tools are exogenous to the theories of punishment, the very foundation for sentencing in Anglo-American jurisprudence. This Article reviews the
legality and propriety of actuarial predictive instruments, using these theories and
governing constitutional and statutory law as the touchstone for this analysis.
This Article then applies these normative and legal principles to seventeen major
characteristics that may comprise an offender’s composite risk profile. It argues
that risk-assessment instruments are problematic for three reasons: they include
characteristics that are prohibited by constitutional and statutory law; subject the
individual to punishment for characteristics over which the individual has no
meaningful control; and presume that the individual is a static entity predisposed,
if not predetermined, to recidivate, thereby undermining individual agency and
betting against the individual’s ability to beat the odds.

INTRODUCTION
Moneyball reveals how the Oakland Athletics upended the conventional
approach by which major league baseball teams predicted future player per-
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formance. 1 Traditionally, these teams projected player performance through
intuition and observation, 2 without much regard to statistics. 3 In 2002, the
budget-conscious Athletics sought a different assessment method, one that
would “minimize risk.” 4 The Athletics turned to statistical analyses of past
player performance as the basis for its predictions of future player performance. 5 This data-driven approach served as an effective and efficient guide of
future player performance, 6 and was appreciably “better than the hoary alternative, rendering decisions by gut feeling.” 7 The Athletics’ success did not go
unnoticed. Indeed, its empirical method of predicting performance is now the
norm in professional baseball. 8
The United States criminal justice system is undergoing a similar transition. 9 Whereas the Athletics tried to predict a player’s future performance, the
criminal justice system seeks, among other things, to predict a defendant’s future dangerousness. As United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens
recognized, “prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in
many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system,” including whether a defendant should be imprisoned and, if so, for how long. 10
These sorts of predictions are, Justice Stevens added, a “task performed countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice.” 11
Historically, courts have calculated an offender’s risk of recidivism on the
basis of an impressionistic, “‘seat of the pants’ guess, about ‘what seems about

1
See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003)
(recounting the story of the Oakland Athletics baseball team using statistics to predict future player
performance).
2
See id. at 242 (“If you trusted [a pitcher’s numbers], you didn’t have to give two minutes’
thought to how a guy looked, or how hard he threw. You could judge a pitcher’s performance objectively, by what he had accomplished.”).
3
See id. at 9 (quoting a scout who admitted that he “never looked at a single statistic of Billy’s”
and noting that Beane’s batting average dropped significantly prior to the draft, yet “scouts never
considered this”).
4
Id. at 136.
5
See id. at 241 (“[I]f you focused on the right statistics you could certainly project a guy based on
[minor league] numbers.”). While Beane is perhaps best-known for the Moneyball approach, its “spiritual father” is sportswriter Bill James. See id. at 64–83 (discussing James’ influence).
6
See id. at 270 (“In all of Major League Baseball only the New York Yankees won as many
games as the Oakland A’s. . . . [T]he teams in baseball’s best division . . . finished in inverse order to
their payrolls, [with the A’s in first place] . . . .”).
7
Id. at 136.
8
See BENJAMIN BAUMER & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE SABERMETRIC REVOLUTION: ASSESSING
THE GROWTH OF ANALYTICS IN BASEBALL, at ix (2014) (estimating that “over three-quarters of major
league teams have individuals dedicated to” player analytics).
9
See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (1992).
10
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens).
11
Id. at 276.
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right’ for the case.” 12 Mainly for cost reasons, 13 however, the criminal justice
system has been shifting away from this approach. More and more, courts today are adopting the use of risk-assessment tools in sentencing. 14 These riskassessment tools take information on recidivism rates for groups and use them
to estimate the risk of recidivism for individuals possessing those same group
characteristics.15
Consider an example. A court is considering the appropriate sentence for
a drug addict from a broken home. Prosecutors present evidence that drug addicts from broken homes are more likely to recidivate than others. The court
takes this into account and may give the offender a sentence of imprisonment
or a harsher prison term precisely because he was identified as a member of
the higher-risk group. A parole board, possessing similar data, may deny release to an inmate with the same socio-economic, substance abuse, and family
traits. By contrast, a sentencer may grant bail to an educated, older white female, or send her to a diversion program, due to evidence that individuals with
the same educational, age, race, and gender demographics are less likely to
recidivate.
The sentencing community is drawn to these methods because they are
said to distinguish with greater accuracy the high-risk from the low-risk, and
thereby allow for the more efficient allocation of sentencing resources.16 For
example, according to their champions, risk-assessment tools help reserve incarceration for the most dangerous and save the low-risk from needlessly languishing in jail or prison. 17 These benefits are particularly attractive in an environment in which our prisons are bloated and our political leaders are costconscious.

12
Paul H. Robinson, One Perspective on Sentencing Reform in the United States, 8 CRIM. L.F. 1,
4 (1997). Robinson, a member of the inaugural U.S. Sentencing Commission, further explains that,
“More often than not, this judgment involves no analysis” and that “judges give a particular kind of
sentence in a particular case because ‘that is the way it has always been done.’” Id. at 4–5.
13
See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assessment in
Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 158, 158 (2014) (explaining that “[m]oney appears to be
the principal answer” for “the sudden return of risk to a place of penalogical prominence”).
14
See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 905–06 (2000) (“[T]he field of ‘violence risk assessment’ has seen
a dramatic shift away from studies attempting to validate the accuracy of clinical predictions, and
toward studies attempting to isolate specific risk factors that are actuarially (meaning statistically)
associated with violence.”).
15
See Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 357, 370 (2006) (defining risk-assessments as “empirically derived mechanical rules for
combining information to produce a quantitative estimate of risk”).
16
See Monahan, supra note 14, at 905–06.
17
See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of EvidenceBased Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 588 (2009).
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It may come as no surprise, therefore, that at least twenty states are using
some form of actuarial risk-assessments. 18 In addition, prominent legal institutions like the American Law Institute (ALI) and the National Center for State
Courts have endorsed these tools.19 Indeed, ALI’s draft revisions to the Model
Penal Code would require state sentencing commissions to use risk-assessment
instruments. 20 Accordingly, courts’ daily predictions about criminal defendants
future behavior are now being performed increasingly on the basis of actuarial
risk-assessments. This trend reveals a growing national acceptance of this statistical technique. 21
But there is one problem: risk-assessment tools have no legitimate basis
in any recognized penological theories. As one prominent penologist observes,
these instruments have “no root, nor any relation to the jurisprudential theories
of just punishment.”22 Other criminal scholars have similarly noted that “courts
rarely have had to address jurisprudential considerations in making violence
risk assessments,” but because “such instruments . . . are being used with increasing frequency in criminal sentencing,” jurisprudential considerations “can
no longer be avoided . . . .” 23 This mismatch between theory and practice cannot be tolerated any longer.
18

See NANCY LEVIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE ASREPORT 39 (2014), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412994-JusticeReinvestment-Initiative-State-Assessment-Report.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4357-C9TL
?type=pdf [hereinafter “JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT”]; Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809 (2014). As this
Article was being prepared for print, Senators John Cornyn and Sheldon Whitehouse introduced a
bipartisan bill that would require risk-assessments of federal offenders. See S. 467, 114th Cong.
(2015); News Release, U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, Sens. Cornyn, Whitehouse Introduce Prison Reform
Legislation (Feb. 10, 2015), available at http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=News
Releases&ContentRecord_id=f6840b81-c2dd-4393-8ff9-f7861e79436d, archived at http://perma.cc/
94AW-C2VQ.
19
See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTENCING
COMM’N, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.vcsc.
virginia.gov/risk_off_rpt.pdf, archived at [https://perma.cc/24BX-ZCCY?type=pdf.
20
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Model%20Penal%20Code%20TD%20No%202%20-%20online
%20version.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/7L3V-LHM2?type=pdf [hereinafter “MPC DRAFT”].
21
See Morris B. Hoffman, Emptying Prisons Is no Panacea, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2014, 8:44
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/30/emptying-prisons-rehabilitation-deterringpunishment-column/16508959/, archived at http://perma.cc/S5TH-Z4VS. Evidence-based sentencing
has been called a “fad.” Id. As these practices are poised to be more prevalent, not less fashionable,
the question becomes how, not so much whether, they should be used.
22
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE 188 (2007). Indeed, Harcourt argues that, in the context of risk-assessments, efficiency has displaced the theories of punishment as the first principle. See id. at 173–92.
23
John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 434–35 (2006); see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Repressed
Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 981 (1978) (urging that the sentencing community turn to the “task of
taming the wild horse of categoric prediction”).
SESSMENT
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This Article is the first to critically examine the legality and propriety of
risk-assessment instruments through the lens of widely-accepted theories of
punishment, and to apply corresponding principles to seventeen major characteristics 24 that may inform actuarial risk assessments. This Article argues that
risk-assessment instruments are problematic for three reasons:
First, certain group-based characteristics discussed in the risk-assessment
context—i.e., race, sex, national origin, religion, socio-economic status—are
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or declared
expressly off-limits by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), 25 which
governs sentencing in the federal courts.
Second, risk-assessment tools identify risk on the basis of an offender’s
group membership or group identity, assign the same monolithic risk profile to
everyone in the group, and premise punishment on group characteristics which
the individual possesses by accident of birth or cannot otherwise meaningfully
change. In doing so, risk-assessment tools sever the link between punishment
and individual conduct, and between punishment and individual control.
Third, risk-assessment tools effectively consider the offender to be a static
entity predisposed, if not predetermined, to recidivate based on the aggregate
behavior of individuals sharing the same group identity, and do not recognize
offenders as dynamic agents capable of reforming, and subsequently lowering
their chance of recidivating.
In light of these three principles, this Article argues that, of the seventeen
major characteristics, only adult criminal history is an appropriate factor in actuarial risk-assessments, provided that adult criminal history is limited by temporal
and qualitative considerations.
Before proceeding, two qualifications on the scope of this Article must be
noted. First, this Article assumes, and does not challenge, the superior accuracy
of actuarial risk-assessments relative to clinical assessments of risk. 26 The as24

These characteristics are race, sex, national origin, religion, socio-economic status, education
and vocational skills, employment record, family rearing practices, family structure, community ties,
family criminality, age, anti-social attitudes and personality, criminal companions, mental illness and
substance abuse, pre-adult anti-social behavior, and adult criminal history.
25
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012). The SRA is part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 98 Stat. 1976.
26
Others have addressed this question, with conflicting results. Compare HARCOURT, supra note
22, at 239 (quoting scholars who doubt that actuarial assessments produce better results than conventional clinical predictions), and Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 97, 11819 (1984) (“[P]redictions using the best actuarial techniques appear to be no better or
worse than the best clinical predictions at identifying those individuals most likely to commit violent
acts.”), with VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK
218 (2006) (noting approvingly scholars who accept the use of actuarial instruments), and Grant T.
Harris et al., Evidence for Risk Estimate Precision: Implications for Individual Risk Communication,
33 BEHAV. SCI. L. 111, 111 (2015) (“The discriminative validity of several actuarial instruments is
well established.”), and Prentky et al., supra note 15, at 372 (“Most scholars have concluded that the
predictive efficacy of actuarial methods of risk assessment is superior to clinically derived assess-
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sessments themselves may be highly effective at identifying high-risk and lowrisk offenders. Even if the assessments are accurate, however, their usage
should give us pause—for reasons beyond their efficacy or accuracy. 27
Second, while risk-assessment tools have been used primarily for “backend” or post-sentencing purposes, this Article is most interested in the potential
for risk-assessments to influence “front-end” sentencing: specifically a judge’s
decision to imprison an offender, and to elongate an offender’s prison term.
The Attorney General recently asked the U.S. Sentencing Commission “to
study the use of data-driven analysis in front-end sentencing—and to issue policy recommendations based on this careful, independent analysis.” 28 These
comments reveal the need for an examination of “big data” in front-end sentencing decisions. They also underscore the fact that this inquiry is particularly
ripe for national, state, and local consideration and implementation.
This Article proceeds by way of the following structure: Part I reviews the
four primary reasons why society may legitimately punish an individual, the
relative prominence of these theories of punishment both historically and currently, and the emergence of hybrid theories of punishment. Part II offers a
descriptive account of actuarial risk-assessment tools in the criminal justice
system, explaining their content, increasing popularity, and purported benefits.
Part III argues that actuarial predictions of recidivism must be limited for the
three reasons enumerated above. Part IV applies this analysis to the seventeen
principal characteristics discussed in the risk-assessment context, explaining
why only adult criminal history, modified by temporal or qualitative considerations, is valid from a penological standpoint. Part IV also responds to potential
counter-arguments. Finally, Part V concludes.
I. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
This Part offers necessary background material for the consideration of
whether and to what extent Moneyball decision-making should be imported
into the sentencing context. First, Section A describes the philosophical reasons why society should punish others. Second, Section B discusses the relative dominance of these reasons over time and in the present day. Finally, Section C examines the development of mixed theories of punishment.
ments of risk . . . .” (citations omitted)). It is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve this disagreement.
27
See United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Evidence-based sentencing . . . must be handled gingerly.”), vacated sub nom, United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204
(2d Cir.), remanded to 972 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
28
Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Address at the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014),
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2014/ag-speech-140801.html, archived at
https://perma.cc/88HM-J678 [hereinafter “Holder Remarks”].
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A. Reasons to Punish
Laws establish the outer bounds of proper conduct. In order to give effect,
laws must have punishments. As Alexander Hamilton recognized, “It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with . . . a penalty or punishment for
disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions
or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more
than advice or recommendation.” 29 If laws require punishments, however, we
must ask precisely why an individual should be punished. Specifically, the
need to punish invites subsequent considerations of how the power to punish
should be exercised and, more generally, what philosophical principles should
guide those punishment decisions.
The four primary theories of punishment fall within two categories: deontological and utilitarian.30 One theory, retribution, stands alone in the deontological camp. Retribution asserts that punishment is an offender’s just deserts
for what he or she has done in the past. 31 Leading retributivist theorist Immanuel Kant wrote that punishment “must in all cases be imposed only because the
individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime.” 32 This is so regardless of any potential, subsequent value of the punishment to others. 33 Retribution can neither be reduced to “an eye for an eye” system of justice, nor can it
be deemed merely “vengeance in disguise.” 34 Rather, under a retributivist
29

THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
See Alfred Blumstein, The Search for the Elusive Common ‘Principle,’ 82 NW. U. L. REV. 43,
44 (1988) (“The four traditional purposes—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
serve only two distinct objectives. These objectives are retribution . . . and crime reduction.”); Aya
Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (“From the
collective theorizing of thousands of the brightest minds, tomes of legal literature, and hundreds of
years of debate, two predominant justifications of criminal punishment have emerged: retributivism
and utilitarianism. Although there are multiple twists on these themes, the basic concept is that criminal liability is justified either because the offender deserves punishment or because punishment makes
society safer . . . .”).
31
See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (2d ed. 1968) (defining retribution as
“the application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally guilty”); MICHAEL S.
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91 (2010) (“We are justified
in punishing because and only because offenders deserve it.”); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTION 35, 37 (1968) (“[B]ecause man is responsible for his actions, he ought to receive
his just deserts.”); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1955) (“[Retribution holds
that] punishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment.”).
32
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie transl., Edinburgh, T&T Clark
1887) (1796).
33
See id. at 198 (“[T]he last murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out.”); see also MOORE, supra note 31, at 88 (“The distinctive aspect of retributivism
is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him . . . .”).
34
See Moore, supra note 31 at 88 (“[R]etributivism is sometimes identified with a particular
measure of punishment such as lex talionis, an eye for an eye . . . .”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 45 (1909). Holmes characterized retribution in these terms, as did Herbert
Wechsler. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097,
30
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framework, the offender is paying a “debt” owed to society for the improper
“benefits and burdens” that he or she received from or imposed on others,
which, when paid, restores an equilibrium within society. In this respect, a retributivist model is primarily backward-looking: it focuses on the wrong previously committed.
By contrast, the three instrumentalist theories of punishment—deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—are primarily forward-looking. They justify
criminal sanction because of the social utility derived from punishing the offender. These utilitarian justifications are predicated on realizing a social good;
retribution, by contrast, sees punishment as intrinsically good.
Of the utilitarian rationales for punishment, the deterrence theory holds
that punishment should serve to discourage the offender (specific deterrence)
and members of the public (general deterrence) from offending in the future.35
Jeremy Bentham, the legal theorist most associated with deterrence, suggested
that punishment is legitimate only to the extent that it reduces the “tendency
towards the prevention of like acts.” 36 In this sense, punishment is a cost that
the offender and others will seek to avoid.37 Punishment therefore operates as a
social message that criminal actions will be met by adverse consequences,
such as those visited upon the instant offender.
The theory of incapacitation is premised on the simple notion that punishment should physically separate the offender from others and thus limit his
or her ability to engage in further harmful actions.38 Blackstone wrote that incapacitation “depriv[es] the party injuring of the power to do future mischief.” 39 It is a form of social protection by way of social segregation; an offender is exiled for the welfare of others in general society.40 In short, incapaci-

1103 (1952); see also HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 34 (1976).
35
See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19 (1830). Bentham wrote, for ex-

ample, that punishment should serve two functions: “[p]articular prevention, which applies to the
delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is applicable to all the members of the community
without exception.” Id.
36
JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 322 (1802).
37
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11. Blackstone noted that punishment exists
as “a precaution against future offences of the same kind,” and that this precaution “is effected . . . by
the amendment of the offender himself” and “by deterring others by the dread of his example from
offending in the like way . . . .” Id.
38
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2490 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If imprisonment
does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general population and prevents him from committing additional crimes in the outside world.”); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights,
37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 989 (1985) (“Proponents of the incapacitation approach believe that the best
way to prevent a particular offender from committing future crimes is to remove him from society.”).
39
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *11–12.
40
See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000) (“Incapacitation uses
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tation is said to be justifiable because it serves as a blunt form of threatremoval.
Finally, the rehabilitative theory of punishment posits that a sentence
should afford the offender an opportunity for personal reform and development. 41 Any gains from this positive transformation will be realized not only
by the individual, but by society, as the offender will pose less danger to society after release. Such self-improvement may take place as a result of atonement
or penance, which may be the product of the offender’s moral code or religious
tradition, or guilt or similar appreciation for one’s actions, which may be secular or emotional in nature.42 It also may take place by way of treatment, 43 including the completion of programs that address the offender’s personal wellbeing, mental health, substance abuse addiction, education, and/or capacity to
respond to triggers to anti-social action.44 In short, rehabilitation demands a
social investment in the offender, which will pay dividends in the offender and
in his or her community.
With an understanding of the four major theoretical reasons why the state
may punish an individual, we may consider the extent to which the criminal
justice system has invoked these reasons over time and today.
B. The Relative Salience of the Reasons to Punish
The American criminal justice system has not settled on any one theory as
the single or main principled foundation for punishment. 45 Rather, at various

imprisonment to remove the offender from society to protect it from the danger he poses. This concept
is also conveyed by the use of the terms ‘isolation,’ ‘segregation,’ ‘restraint,’ and ‘confinement.’”).
41
See United States v. Cole, 622 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“Rehabilitation, generally, endeavors to turn one person’s path.”).
42
Cotton, supra note 40, at 1317 (describing rehabilitation as including “an opportunity for penitent reflection”). For a discussion of “secular atonement” that incarceration affords, see Stephen P.
Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1810–27 (1999).
43
Of course, the personal transformation signified by atonement or penance, for example, should
not be seen as inconsistent with, or an absolute alternative to, rehabilitation by way of treatment. Both
may be used simultaneously, and as mutually reinforcing and reciprocal supplemental approaches. In
other words, there is no “either-or” situation within the ambit of rehabilitation.
44
Cotton, supra note 40, at 1316–17 (defining rehabilitation as “an opportunity to provide training for skills useful in the marketplace, treatment for psychological problems and drug addiction”);
Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005) (remarking that rehabilitation
“assumes that the offender has identifiable and treatable problems which cause him to commit crimes”
and therefore “seeks to reduce the offender’s future criminality by addressing those causes through
education and treatment in prison or in a nonprison program”).
45
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 455
(1997) (“The debate between the desert justification and the various utilitarian justifications such as
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation has continued to divide criminal law thinkers to this
day.”).
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points in American history, one or multiple theories have served as the primary
justification for punishment. 46
In early America, punishment was directed largely at deterring crime. 47
Banishing offenders, a form of exile akin to incapacitation, also animated punishment. 48 Retribution became a factor only in the context of the most serious
offenses, such as murder. 49 Rehabilitation did not seem to inform punishment,
as sentencers were said to be concerned not with “reform[ing] the offender but
[with] fright[ening] him into lawful behavior.” 50
In the nineteenth century, however, rehabilitation emerged as a major sentencing model. 51 As one criminal law scholar writes, the country “move[d] . . .
toward the development of penitentiaries focused on the spiritual rehabilitation
of lawbreakers.” 52 This emphasis on rehabilitation continued in the twentieth
century. 53 Further “advances in medicine and psychology . . . reinforce[d] [the]
view of criminal offenders as ‘sick’” as well as the goal of “sentencing
schemes . . . to help ‘cure’ the patient.” 54
The attraction of the rehabilitative model faded in the twentieth century.
Since rehabilitative punishment seeks to improve the offender such that he or
she is better able to stay within the bounds of the law, judges necessarily had to
tailor sentences to maximize the opportunity for that internal development. 55
This individualized sentencing led to inevitable disparities in sentencing. The
notion that each individual is different and has unique needs created tension

46
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (“The principles which have guided criminal
sentencing . . . have varied with the times.”).
47
See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 112 (Norval Morris
& David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (“The primary goal in dispending . . . penalties was deterrence, in the
hope that the punishment would serve to keep the offender from repeating the crime in this particular
community.”).
48
See id. at 113 (“[B]anishment represented the town’s efforts to avoid the repetition of a crime
by getting rid of the offender . . . .”).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 116 (“Reform, not deterrence, was now the aim of incarceration. The shared assumption
was that since the convict was not innately depraved but had failed to be trained to obedience by family, church, school, or community, he could be redeemed by the well-ordered routine of prison.”).
52
Douglas A. Berman, The Enduring (and Again Timely) Wisdom of the Original MPC Sentencing Provisions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 709, 715 (2009).
53
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”).
54
Berman, supra note 52, at 715.
55
Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 52 (2011) (“These discretionary systems originally were premised on the punishment rationale of rehabilitation. Discretionary schemes allowed judges to tailor sentences to the
specific characteristics of the individual defendant with an eye towards reforming the defendant’s
lawbreaking ways.”).
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with the proposition that similar defendants receive similar sentences. 56 A
combination of disparities in sentencing and uncertainty in the term of imprisonment provoked significant changes in the modern criminal justice system.
In 1984, Congress responded to these twin concerns by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”). 57 In particular, the SRA established the Sentencing Guidelines, an advisable range of sentencing outcomes based on two inputs: the offense conduct (i.e., what the offender has done this time) and the
offender’s criminal history (i.e., what the offender has done in the past). 58
These ranges act as a “national norm” that judges must consult upon the imposition of a sentence. 59 In particular, a federal judge must use the Guidelines as
the “starting point and initial benchmark” for his or her analysis of an appropriate sentence. 60 The SRA also established the U.S. Sentencing Commission,

56
Parole officers engaged in similar discretionary decision-making in determining whether and
when inmates were sufficiently rehabilitated and prepared for release into general society. See Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity from Differences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435, 440 (2002) (“[B]road
judicial discretion in the ascription of sentencing terms—complemented by parole officials exercising
similar discretion concerning prison release dates—was viewed as necessary to ensure that sentences
could be tailored to the rehabilitative prospects and progress of each offender.”).
57
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–66 (1989); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2013) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL] (explaining that, through the SRA,
“Congress first sought honesty in sentencing” by avoiding “indeterminate sentence[s] of imprisonment,” and “[s]econd, Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide
disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders”).
58
Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2079 (2013) (noting that the Guidelines are “a system
under which a set of inputs specific to a given case (the particular characteristics of the offense and
offender) yielded a predetermined output (a range of months within which the defendant could be
sentenced)”). The Guidelines’ Sentencing Table features the offense conduct and the offender’s criminal history background as the two axes that operate as the primary factors as to the defendant’s appropriate sentence. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). The
ranges themselves were the average sentences imposed at the time of the SRA’s enactment. Justice
Stephen Breyer, a member of the inaugural Sentencing Commission, explained that the Commission
“decided to base the Guidelines primarily upon typical, or average, actual past practice.” Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 17 (1988).
59
According to multiple courts, the Guidelines are useful in that they establish a “national norm”
as to the appropriate sentence for like offenses by like offenders. See, e.g., United States v. GonzalezHuerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006);
Federal Sentencing Options After Booker: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 112th
Cong. 6–10 (2012) (statement of Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. Dist. J.), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_
16_Barbadoro.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GS23-2398 (“Judges . . . appreciate knowing whether
their sentences are in step with other sentences by other judges for similar cases.”). In 2005, the Supreme Court declared these ranges advisory, rather than mandatory. See United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005).
60
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007). To the extent that a sentence imposed by a federal judge deviates from the Guidelines system, a judge must explain in greater detail why the nonGuidelines sentence is appropriate. See id. at 50.
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an independent agency within the federal courts whose role is to create, revisit,
and revise the Guidelines. 61
The SRA codified the four basic purposes of criminal punishment. The
statute expressly provides that a court imposing a sentence must consider the
need “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense” (which corresponds with the
retributive justification of punishment); “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” (deterrence); “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant” (incapacitation); and “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner” (rehabilitation).62 The SRA does not select a preferred justification to guide sentencing decisions, nor does it create any specific hierarchy among the purposes.63 Instead, all are listed in a co-equal manner. 64 The SRA gives judges the general—and rather difficult— instruction to
impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to effectuate these four purposes. 65
C. Hybrid Theories of Punishment
Judges may find it quite challenging, if not impossible, to fulfill the SRA’s
mandate to impose a punishment that reflects the four purposes. Indeed, many
scholars view the retributivist and utilitarian purposes of punishment as incon-

61
See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 2 (“[The SRA] empowered the
Commission with ongoing responsibilities to monitor the guidelines [and] submit to Congress appropriate modifications of the guidelines and recommended changes in criminal statutes,” and this “mandate rested on congressional awareness that sentencing is a dynamic field that requires continuing
review by an expert body to revise sentencing policies . . . .”). For a summary of the Commission’s
responsibilities, see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 369–70.
62
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012).
63
See Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 11–13
(“Though in the Sentencing Reform Act Congress expressed a fundamental concern with principled
sentencing, the SRA did not adopt a particular punishment philosophy; rather, its statutory statement
of purposes listed all of the traditional justifications of punishment. . . . [T]hrough two decades of
federal sentencing reform neither Congress nor the United States Sentencing Commission has expressly defined or fully articulated the central or primary purposes for federal sentencing.”). To be
sure, “the Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory,” and “a sentence can
have a variety of justifications.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (internal quotes and
citation omitted).
64
Judges and others have debated which theory has dominated and should dominate sentencing.
See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring) (opining that “deterrence is the surest ground for punishment, since retributive norms are so unsettled”);
Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. REV. 71, 100–01 (2010)
(suggesting that rehabilitation has played a secondary role among penological interests).
65
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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sistent. 66 As John Rawls wrote, ”one feels the force of both arguments and one
wonders how they can be reconciled.”67
This tension is especially pronounced in the strict form of retributivism,
which is expressed today in two main strands. The “affirmative” strand of retributivism contends that an offender who breaks the law must be punished,
irrespective of the public safety gains of punishment. 68 The second strand of
retribution, the soft or “negative” view, holds that punishment, if inflicted,
must be because of the offender’s desert. 69 Utilitarians do not have an automatic, “affirmative” analogue. The single utilitarian position is conditional: an offender should be punished only if there are public safety benefits to punishment. 70 This Article, which presumes the offender is guilty and will be punished no matter the theory of punishment, need not resolve this disharmony.
Turning to Rawls’ question of whether retribution and utilitarianism can
be reconciled, legal philosophers have taken on the onerous task of fusing the
two purposes into a single suitable instrument of punishment. In particular,
they have posited that retributive values may serve as “side restraints” on the
achievement of utilitarian objectives. The term “side constraint,” attributed to
philosopher Robert Nozick, refers to restrictions on the process of achieving
some end or objective. Nozick writes, for example, that individual rights may
not be an end that competes with other social ends, but rather a limitation on
the means used to further social ends, whatever they may be. 71
To provide another example, Bentham, perhaps the foremost advocate of
utilitarianism, proposed that punishment be justified for utilitarian reasons. Yet
any resulting punishment, Bentham argued, should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense—despite the fact that seriousness is a retributivist consideration. 72 In this respect, retributive notions of seriousness are a side constraint on utilitarian goals. To offer yet another example, renowned legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart recognized that “any morally tolerable account of this
66

See PACKER, supra note 31, at 36 (positing that the two overarching purposes of punishment—
retribution, “the deserved infliction of suffering on evil doers,” and utilitarianism, “the prevention of
crime”—are “almost universally thought of as being incompatible”).
67
Rawls, supra note 31, at 5. His solution was that “utilitarian arguments are appropriate with
regard to questions about practices, while retributive arguments fit the application of particular rules
to particular cases.” Id.
68
See Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivism Refined—Or Run Amok?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 557
(2010) (reviewing LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, WITH STEPHEN MORSE,
CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009)).
69
See id.
70
See Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 116 (2000) (“Utilitarian penology treats punishment as . . . permissible
only when its benefits in reducing future crime outweigh the pain, fear, and public expense it imposes.”) (emphasis added).
71
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974) (suggesting that rights may be
“side constraints upon the actions to be done,” irrespective of the goals of the actions).
72
Id. at 12.
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institution [of criminal punishment] must exhibit it as a compromise between
distinct and partly conflicting principles.” 73 He suggested that blameworthiness, fairness, and proportionality should restrain punishments otherwise justified on utilitarian grounds.74 These arguments that utilitarian imperatives be
qualified by retributivist principles represent a merger between, or hybrid form
of, retributive and utilitarian theories.
These attempts at reconciliation, particularly Hart’s formulation, are regarded as “extremely influential” and are heralded for their “dominance.” 75
Indeed, hybrid or mixed theories of punishment have been implemented in a
number of states. One criminal law professor observes that “most jurisdictions
have adopted a model that uses retribution as a limitation on utilitarian
goals.” 76
The benefits of the hybrid approach are readily understandable. The side
constraint approach avoids the “either-or” problem of choosing between the
two theoretical camps. As the criminal law theorist Herbert Packer noted, “it
would be socially damaging in the extreme to discard either” the retributivist
or consequentialist theory.” 77 Indeed, a mixed theory affords the criminal justice system the ability to take advantage of the virtues of both theories as the
cases demand. This is valuable because no single purpose for punishment is
satisfactory in all sentencing occasions.78 It also comports with the reality of
sentencing. Packer observes that “the institution of criminal punishment draws
substance from both of these ultimate purposes . . . .” 79
Finally, in the federal system, where the SRA mandates that judges impose
sentences that reflect retributivist and utilitarian purposes,80 the hybrid approach
may be somewhat of a necessity. The hybrid system facilitates this task. Accordingly, the four purposes of punishment “can all be pursued under a regime with

73

See HART, supra note 31, at 1.
Id. at 11–13.
75
Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and Scalia: Philosophy, Proportionality, and the Eighth
Amendment, 55 VILL. L. REV. 321, 359 (2010).
76
Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 123 (2008).
77
PACKER, supra note 31, at 37.
78
See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principals for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U.
L. REV. 19, 36 (1987). Alfred Blumstein offers four hypotheticals that, together, help highlight the
value of an integrated sentencing model: an income tax violator would receive a sentence animated
most by deterrence, a man who kills his wife in the heat of passion would receive a sentence justified
most by just deserts, and a robber with a substance abuse problem would be deemed less blameworthy
than a conspirator who is clean even though the diseased confederate is more likely to recidivate.
Blumstein, supra note 30, at 47.
79
PACKER, supra note 31, at 37; cf. Monahan, supra note 23, at 427 (“[M]odern sentencing is
either purely retributive, or it is a mix of retributive and crime-control considerations.”).
80
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
74
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retributivism as a side constraint, as long as such pursuits do not violate the side
constraint.”81
II. EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING
This Part summarizes actuarial risk-assessment instruments. First, Section
A offers an overview of the emergence of risk-assessment tools in criminal
sentencing. Second, Section B gives examples of how risk-assessment tools
are utilized in practice. Finally, Section C summarizes the purported benefits of
risk-assessment tools in criminal sentencing.
A. What—Predicting Risk of Recidivism
Recidivism, an offender’s relapse into criminal behavior, is a fundamental
issue in sentencing. The prospect of recidivism leads courts to seek sentences
that mitigate the likelihood that an individual may re-offend. It also moves
courts to ensure that, if an individual does re-offend, subsequent sentences can
respond commensurately to the individual’s demonstrated inability or unwillingness to conform to the law.
From its earliest moments, the American criminal justice system has been
concerned by recidivism. In colonial America, laws dealing with recidivism
trace back to at least 1695.82 As an example of one such law, Virginia in 1705
addressed “the persistent problem of hog stealing by passing a statute that provided progressively more severe penalties for each subsequent offense.” 83
In order to tailor initial sentences to reduce or eliminate recidivism, sentencers must gauge the potential for the offender to recidivate. They must, in
essence, forecast a person’s penchant for future criminality.
The American criminal justice system entered this prediction business
almost a century ago. The first recorded effort to predict recidivism was developed in 1928 for an Illinois parole board. 84 Two years later, criminologists
published a study of 510 offenders released from 1911 through 1922, in which
they specifically analyzed these offenders’ recidivism rates, identifying several
recurring causes. 85

81
Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677,
743 (2005).
82
See Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Prediction of Recidivism, 96
HARV. L. REV. 511, 511 (1982).
83
Id. (citing LAWS OF VIRGINIA 276–78 (W. Hening ed., 1823)).
84
See Coffee, supra note 23, at 1011.
85
See generally SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930)
(providing in-depth analysis of 500 criminals’ careers). For follow-up and related studies by these
impressive authors, see generally SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, LATER CRIMINAL CAREERS (1937); SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, CRIMINAL CAREERS IN RETROSPECT
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Though the practice of predicting future criminality stretches back many
years, the prediction enterprise did not began in earnest until the last three decades. The courtroom context of setting bail helps illustrate this. Historically,
judges would grant bail, except for those who presented a flight risk and those
who were alleged to have committed capital crimes and thus were deemed
imminent threats to public safety on the basis of the capital offense. 86 In the
contemporary criminal justice system, however, federal law and corresponding
state statutes have vastly expanded the scope of those who may be detained
pretrial. 87 Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, for instance, judges were authorized to deny bail to those who were categorically treated as threats to public safety on account of their charge, and also to those that the judges determined would “endanger the safety of any other person or the community.” 88
This non-categorical approach demanded that judges engage in predictions of
which offenders would likely not re-offend, and therefore could be released
pretrial, and those who presented a substantial threat of endangering others and
thus could be detained pretrial.
Today, predictions of recidivism are ubiquitous in criminal sentencing.
According to Justice John Paul Stevens, “prediction of future criminal conduct
is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system,” and a “task performed countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice.”89 Elsewhere, the Court observed,
“prediction of future criminal conduct . . . forms an important element in many
decisions . . . .” 90 One judge noted that “[p]rediction is inherent in sentencing
decisions,” 91 while a law professor who writes frequently on this subject, put it
more bluntly: “everybody’s doing it.” 92
Beyond bail, predictions of future dangerousness inform numerous sentencing decisions. These include “whether multiple sentences should run consecutively or concurrently,” “the appropriate conditions of probation,” and “the nature of any sanction to be imposed upon violation of probation.”93 This Article

(1943); SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK JUVENILE DELINQUENTS GROWN UP (1940);
SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950).
86
See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 503
(2012).
87
See id. at 499.
88
18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012).
89
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens).
90
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984).
91
See Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety Through
State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1406 (2008).
92
Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT’G REP.
167, 168 (2014).
93
Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1311 (2007).
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focuses mainly on whether and for how long an offender should be imprisoned. 94
In short, forecasting the risk of recidivism is an important function in the
criminal justice system; these predictions are widespread and common within
the system; and the predictions influence an extensive range of sentencing decisions.
B. How—From Clinical Judgments to Actuarial Instruments
For the most part, predicting an offender’s risk of recidivating has been
done by way of clinical assessments. Akin to the observational, intuitive judgments relied on by baseball teams to estimate a player’s future performance,
clinical predictions of risk are characterized as “an informal, ‘in the head,’
[and] impressionistic, subjective conclusion” about the offender’s future dangerousness. 95 In the clinical model, assessments are generally made in two
ways. One, mental health professionals such as a psychologist or psychiatrist
may evaluate an individual and then communicate their assessment to the
court. 96 Or, two, an actor in the criminal justice system like a judge or a parole
board makes a direct assessment of the individual’s dangerousness. Generally,
a clinical assessment is based on a comprehensive interview of the individual,
interviews of those in the individual’s family and social circles, and a review
of files on the individual’s mental history insofar as these materials may relate
to the individual’s future dangerousness. 97
To provide an example of the contents of the interviews, in one clinical
survey an individual’s propensity for violence is ascertained by reference to
twelve questions. These questions include whether the individual lived with
both of his or her parents to the age of sixteen, whether the individual experienced any behavioral problems in elementary school, whether the individual
has a history of alcohol abuse, and whether the individual is married. 98 The
twelve inputs also include an assessment of whether the individual meets the
94

The in-out decision and length of incarceration decision are themselves composites of several
subsidiary questions, including “whether an offender is suitable for a non-incarceration sanction,”
what may be “the most appropriate form of intermediate or non-incarceration sanction,” whether the
offender is eligible for a diversion program, and whether the offender is amenable to treatment. Id.
95
William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (1996).
96
The acceptance in court of such professional opinion is reflected by the following Supreme
Court comment: “The suggestion that no psychiatrist’s testimony may be presented with respect to a
defendant’s future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel.” Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983).
97
See Slobogin, supra note 26, at 119.
98
VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 162
(2d ed. 2006) (displaying a chart noting the twelve variables and their corresponding correlation with
recidivism).
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clinical standard for having either a personality disorder or schizophrenia, or
being a psychopath. 99
Increasingly, the criminal justice system has been transitioning from these
types of clinical predictions to actuarial predictions of risk. It has been noted
that, “the field of ‘violence risk assessment’ has seen a dramatic shift away
from studies attempting to validate the accuracy of clinical predictions, and
toward studies attempting to isolate specific risk factors that are actuarially
(meaning statistically) associated with violence.” 100 Others have recognized
this “transformation” in penal ideology and the “emergence of . . . language of
probability and risk increasingly replaces earlier discourses of clinical diagnosis and retributive judgment.” 101
This begs the question: what is an actuarial risk-assessment? The actuarial
model “relies solely on variables known to correlate statistically with violent
behavior” and in particular “produces a numerical probability that an individual with given characteristics will act violently within a fixed time period.” 102
Psychologists provide a helpful definition of actuarial risk-assessments: “empirically derived mechanical rules for combining information to produce a
quantitative estimate of risk.” 103 The contents of the tools themselves can vary
widely—they may analyze as few as ten factors or as many as one hundred. 104
Beyond the meaning of actuarial risk-assessments, examples of these predictive instruments may be helpful. While others have focused on state riskassessments, these two examples are drawn from the federal sentencing system.
The aforementioned Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires a judge, in consideration
of whether an individual should be detained pretrial, to be assured that the individual would not pose a threat to the “safety of any other person and the community . . . .” 105 The statute compels judges to weigh, in making this determination, the charged offense, the evidence against the individual, and, most important here, the “history and characteristics of the person . . . .”106 These “history and characteristics” include, according to the statute, “the person’s character,
physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources,
99

Id.
John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 905–06 (2000) (internal footnote omitted).
101
Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (1992).
102
Slobogin, supra note 26, at 110.
103
See Prentky et al., supra note 15, at 370; see also PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 3 (1954) (“The mechanical combining of information for classification purposes,
and the resultant probability figure which is an empirically determined relative frequency, are the
characteristics that define the actuarial or statistical type of prediction.”).
104
See Joseph Walker, States Turn to Software to Make Parole Decisions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12,
2013, at A1.
105
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012).
106
Id. § 3142(g)(1)–(3).
100
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length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, [and] criminal history,” 107 as well as “whether, at
the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole,
or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence
for an offense under Federal, State, or local law . . . .” 108
In response to the fact that pretrial detention had become the rule and not
the exception, and given the economic, logistical, and constitutional costs of
such significant pretrial detention, federal pretrial service officers developed an
actuarial tool, known as the Pretrial Risk Assessment (“PTRA”). 109 The PTRA
consists of several scored inputs, which are divided into two domains: “criminal history” and “other.” 110 The criminal history questions include whether the
individual has any felony convictions and if so how many, whether the individual has any pending felonies or misdemeanors, the type and class of the
current offense, and the individual’s age. 111 The “other” inputs include the
highest level of education achieved by the individual, the individual’s employment status and history, where the individual lives and whether he or she
owns this place of residence, and the individual’s substance or alcohol abuse, if
any. 112 The individual is then assigned to one of five risk levels. 113 Pretrial services officers will report his or her assessment, and make a corresponding detention or release recommendation to a judge. 114
Whereas PTRA addresses pretrial detention, the Post-Conviction Risk Assessment (“PCRA”) concerns the other end of the sentencing process: postrelease supervision. In the 1970s, the federal judiciary “required probation officers to classify persons under supervision into maximum, medium, and minimum supervision categories dependent upon the nature and seriousness of the
original offense, extent of prior criminal history, and social and personal background factors in the individual case.” 115 Federal probation officers therefore
107
Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A). This Article excluded from this list one characteristic (i.e., the person’s
“record concerning appearance at court proceedings[,]”) as it does not seem germane to the question
of future dangerousness. See id.
108
Id. § 3142(g)(3)(B).
109
See Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, The Development of an Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services, 73 FED. PROBATION 33, 33–35 (2009).
110
OFFICE OF PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERV., FEDERAL PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT USER’S
MANUAL AND SCORING GUIDE 2 (2010). The nine unscored inputs, which do not “contribute to the
overall risk score,” are not included. Id.
111
Id. at 5, 7–10. Questions relating to failure to appear are excluded. See id. at 6.
112
Id. at 12–14, 16–17. Questions relating to failure to appear are excluded. See id. at 19–27.
113
Id. at 3.
114
See Timothy P. Cadigan & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Implementing Risk Assessment in the
Federal Pretrial Services System, 75 FED. PROBATION 30, 30–33 (2011).
115
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL POST CONVICTION
RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/
PCRA_Sep_2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LX6A-YB3S (citation and internal quotes omitted)
[hereinafter “PCRA OVERVIEW”].
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developed and used actuarial tools designed to help them determine “how
much time and effort to devote to working with certain groups of persons.” 116
The PCRA remains the probation office’s current predictive instrument and
consists of fifteen scored inputs. 117 These include the offender’s age, the total
number of the offender’s adult convictions, prior arrests for violent crimes, domestic violence, and other prior arrests, the offender’s history of sex offending
offenses, the different types of offenses that the offender has engaged in, how
many times the offender was “written up” and “officially punished” while incarcerated, whether the offender committed a new crime while under previous periods of supervision, the highest level of education that the offender has completed, whether the offender was employed at the time the pre-sentence investigation
report was prepared and at the time of arrest, and whether the offender has a current alcohol or drug problem.118 An offender’s actuarial risk profile can then determine the level of supervision the probation office will dedicate to the offender.
In addition to these federal actuarial tools, twenty states have adopted, or
are adopting, actuarial risk assessment instruments: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. 119 In addition, external legal organizations have also endorsed risk-assessments. The American Law Institute, perhaps most prominent of these groups, has proposed revisions to the Model Penal Code that would require state sentencing systems to implement actuarial
risk assessments. 120 The National Center for State Courts has actively advocated for the use of these tools as well. 121
In sum, the criminal justice system is moving away from a clinical or impressionistic method of assessing the risk of recidivism to an actuarial model.
The embrace of this data-driven approach has reached the federal level and is
spreading across the states.
C. Why—Benefits of Risk-Assessment Tools
What accounts for this trend? Risk-assessment tools are popular because
they are said to offer several distinct and attractive benefits. First, the tools are
premised upon statistical analysis. This is noteworthy because of legislators’ and
116

Id. (citation and internal quotes omitted).
See James L. Johnson et al., The Construction and Validation of the Federal Post Conviction
Risk Assessment (PCRA), 75 FED. PROBATION 16, 29 (2011).
118
See id.
119
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 18, at 39; Starr, supra note 18, at 809.
120
See MPC DRAFT, supra note 20, § 6B.09.
121
See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 1–2. The Pew Center on the States is another respected
organization that has signed on to these tools. See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE
HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 42–43 (2012).
117
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judges’ preferences to rely on empirical approaches. The Sentencing Guidelines,
for example, use the average sentences imposed during the pre-Guidelines era as
their starting point for calculating uniform guidelines. 122 The Sentencing Commission consciously selected this data-driven approach as an alternative to the
difficult task of choosing between or integrating competing sentencing philosophies. 123 Risk assessment instruments thus seek to follow this preference for empirical information.
Second, in contrast to clinical evaluations of risk, which are a function of
the “subjective impression” of the mental health professional,124 actuarial risk
assessments are the product of mathematical scores and thus “yield an objective
estimate of violence risk.” 125 Third, and relatedly, whereas clinical opinions
may vary widely depending on the professional conducting the evaluation, actuarial risk assessments produce consistent and reliable numbers no matter
who does the calculation. 126 Fourth, and relatedly, allowing judges to receive
and act on numbers that are identical for all judges will promote judicial uniformity and limit judicial discretion. 127
Fifth, and importantly, compared to clinical assessments, actuarial risk assessments are purported to be more effective in forecasting who will recidivate 128 and in sorting offenders into more detailed risk categories.129 For example, a mental health expert may be able to state that an offender is “dangerous” or “non-dangerous”; 130 a risk assessment instrument, however, may assign offenders to different gradients of risk, such as “high,” “moderate,” “lowmoderate,” and “low.” 131

122

See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, ch.1, pt. A, subpt. 1(3).
See id.
124
Slobogin, supra note 26, at 122.
125
Monahan, supra note 23, at 406.
126
See Slobogin, supra note 26, at 122–23. But see Coffee, supra note 23, at 1002 (“[The] neutrality [offered by actuarial tools] becomes untenable when the poor, high-risk offender receives a
longer sentence for such a crime than the rich, low-risk offender.”).
127
See Wolff, supra note 91, at 1416 (“‘Evidence-based sentencing’ should replace the misunderstood phrase ‘judicial discretion.’ As with many decisions in our courts and in our criminal justice
system, discretion is inherent. Instead of removing discretion, we should be prepared to defend our
decisions by basing them on evidence . . . .”).
128
See Monahan, supra note 23, at 408 (“The general superiority of actuarial over clinical risk
assessment in the behavioral sciences has been known for half a century.”). Experts have expressed
disagreement as to whether actuarial risk assessments are indeed better.
129
See Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Criminogenic Needs and the Transformative Risk Subject: Hybridizations of Risk/Need in Penality, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 1, 29–51 (2004) (“[R]isk instruments
demonstrate an increasingly refined capacity to sort and classify criminalized populations.”), quoted in
Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk Assessments
and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 729 (2011).
130
See Slobogin, supra note 26, at 123.
131
See Johnson et al., supra note 117, at 20.
123
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The claimed efficiencies of risk assessment tools are possible because the
tools are the product of multiple characteristics that correlate with higher recidivism. 132 The Supreme Court has recognized that “a prediction of future criminal conduct is ‘an experienced prediction based on a host of variables’ which
cannot be readily codified.” 133 That said, proponents of risk-assessment instruments have identified several characteristics that have such a positive correlation. Criminologists note that a defendant’s following characteristics parallel recidivism: criminal companions has the strongest association; antisocial
personality, criminogenic needs, adult criminal history, and race are highly correlative; pre-adult antisocial behavior, family rearing practices, social achievement, interpersonal conflict, and current age have somewhat of a relationship;
and substance abuse, family structure, intellectual functioning, family criminality, gender, socio-economic status of origin, and personal distress have a
“weak-but-significant” correlation. 134
Sixth, to the degree that the actuarial risk assessments are able to accurately filter offenders into different risk categories, these tools may be able to
direct programmatic efforts and save prison beds for the high-risk, while diverting the low-risk to settings requiring less attention. This could save significant taxpayer money, which is especially appealing in a time when American
prisons are overcrowded and the costs of incarceration are of great public concern. Citing Oleson, a federal district court judge wrote, “If race, gender or age
are predictive as validated by good empirical analysis, and we truly care about
public safety while at the same time depopulating our prisons, why wouldn’t a
rationale [sic] sentencing system freely use race, gender or age as predictor of
future criminality?” 135
Seventh, risk assessment tools are purported to help prevent excessive—
and therefore unjustified—punishment. In the words of law professor John
Coffee, “it is unnecessarily cruel to impose more punishment than is minimally
necessary to realize our incapacitory purpose. Arguably, a failure to so differentiate thus becomes unconscionable.” 136 Risk-assessments that capture an
132

See Hyatt et al., supra note 129, at 729 (positing that actuarial risk-assessments “can help . . .
refocus the sentencing process on the offender’s conduct and the characteristics that are most relevant
to determining the risk to the community that they may pose”).
133
Schall, 467 U.S. at 279 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 16 (1979)).
134
See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based
Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1350–51 (2011). These characteristics will be evaluated in Part IV
on the basis of a standard established in Part III.
135
Richard G. Kopf, Like the Ostrich That Buries Its Head in the Sand, Mr. Holder Is Wrong
About Data-Driven Sentencing, HERCULES AND THE UMPIRE (Aug. 10, 2014), http://herculesandthe
umpire.com/2014/08/10/like-the-ostrich-that-buries-its-head-in-the-sand-mr-holder-is-wrong-aboutdata-driven-sentencing, archived at http://perma.cc/H95S-UGV9.
136
Coffee, supra note 23, at 1005.
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individual’s risk profile and dictate commensurate punishment are said to reduce the possibility that individuals will be unduly jailed or incarcerated.
In sum, there are numerous purported benefits to actuarial risk-assessments,
which are grounded in their empirical nature. To many, these tools carry the
promise of objective and consistent sentencing decisions, appropriately restrained judicial decision-making, and an efficient deployment of strained penal
resources.
III. LIMITS ON RISK-ASSESSMENTS
Having explored the benefits and increasing popularity of risk-assessment
tools, we must now analyze their legality and propriety. This Part suggests that
three considerations should guide an evaluation of risk-assessment tools. First,
Section A explores whether constitutional or statutory law forbids any of the
traits. Second, Section B examines whether the traits track individual conduct.
Finally, Section C questions whether the traits reflect the ability of the individual to reduce, over time, his or her likelihood of recidivating.
A. Risk-Assessments and Legal Limits
1. Statutory Limits
Congress enacted the SRA as a response to concerns about disparate and
indeterminate sentencing. 137 The SRA’s primary accomplishment was to establish the Sentencing Guidelines, which all federal judges must now use as the
starting point for a sentencing determination.138
Most relevant for our purposes, the SRA states that a judge, in imposing a
sentence, “shall consider . . . the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant . . . .” 139 This language is unmistakably broad. Despite this, however, the universe of offender characteristics that a federal judge may weigh is not unbounded. In fact, the SRA specifies that some offender characteristics are expressly prohibited from consideration. The SRA states that the Guidelines must be “entirely neutral as to the
race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.” 140
The Senate Report explains that this limiting provision was designed
to make it absolutely clear that it was not the purpose of the list of
offender characteristics set forth [above] . . . to suggest in any way
137
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–66 (1989); Doug Keller, Why the Prior
Conviction Sentencing Enhancements in Illegal Re-Entry Cases Are Unjust and Unjustified (and Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REV. 719, 725 (2010).
138
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
139
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012).
140
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012).
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that . . . it might be appropriate, for example, to afford preferential
treatment to defendants of a particular race or religion or level of affluence, or to relegate to prisons defendants who are poor, uneducated, and in need of education and vocational training. 141
Accordingly, Congress declared race, sex, national origin, religion, and socioeconomic status off-limits in risk-assessment instruments in the federal system. 142
While the SRA only governs the federal system, it may be instructive for
the states as well. Most states have not announced their respective punishment
goals, 143 but those who have seem to embody the same general philosophical
justifications for criminal sanction.144 Accordingly, Congress’s view of these
factors may illuminate whether and to what extent states should be able to
adopt the same factors in their respective risk-assessment tools. That is, the
federal view of these characteristics can inform whether and how to apply
these traits in state sentencing systems.
As such, the rest of this Part provides grounds to curb risk-assessment
tools in both the state and federal systems. For now, it is established that the
SRA, by its own terms, forbids the use of race, sex, national origin, religion,
socio-economic status in federal sentencing, including penal evaluations of an
individual’s propensity to recidivate.
2. Constitutional Limits
Constitutional considerations limit many factors often used in riskassessment tools. In both federal and state sentencing, risk-assessment tools must
comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
equal protection guarantee that has been read into the Fifth Amendment. 145 According to the Supreme Court, “the Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a
141

S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 171 (1983).
Parts III.B and C will provide additional, independently sufficient reasons why these factors
cannot be included in risk-assessments, cementing the argument that these five factors are inappropriate for predictive purposes. See infra notes 193–275 and accompanying text.
143
See State v. Roth, 471 A.2d 370, 376 (N.J. 1984) (“Our Legislature has not stated the aims to
be achieved by punishment. Indeed few Legislatures have, and where they have, the statement has
been too general to be of service.”) (internal quotations omitted).
144
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-101 (2013) (setting forth Montana’s sentencing policy,
which enumerates the four traditional purposes of punishment); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(6) (McKinney 2009) (noting the utilitarian reasons for punishment); Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 956 (Nev.
1989) (noting the four purposes of punishment).
145
U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .”); id. § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”); see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (explaining that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component applicable to
the federal government). For convenience, this Article uses the “Equal Protection Clause” or “Equal
Protection” as shorthand for these complementary constitutional provisions.
142
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direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”146 This principle, however, is not absolute. Indeed, there are circumstances under which a
government actor may treat similarly situated individuals differently in a manner
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. 147
a. Suspect Classifications
When the government treats similarly situated individuals differently because of race, 148 national origin,149 or religion,150 courts require a “compelling”
justification for the differential treatment and ask the government to demonstrate that the means chosen are “narrowly tailored” to further the compelling
end. 151 This level of review is known as “strict scrutiny.” The Supreme Court
has identified a limited set of reasons that are sufficiently “compelling” to justify differential treatment on the basis of these suspect classifications. First, the
Court has held that an institution of higher education may consider race in admissions in order to achieve the educational benefits of a diverse student
body. 152 Second, an employer may use race to remedy past discrimination for
which it is responsible. 153 Third, in deference to national security exigencies,
the Court has permitted the government to consider race in the execution of
wartime policies, such as the internment of individuals of Japanese ancestry
during World War II. 154 The Court has also held that strict scrutiny is the prop146

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985).
See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (“When those who appear similarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at least a rational reason for the difference, to ensure that all persons subject to legislation or regulation are indeed
being ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions.’”). A classic example of the Supreme
Court rejecting an Equal Protection challenge is Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. See 348 U.S.
483 (1955).
148
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[When
government decisions] touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, [a plaintiff] is entitled to
a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.”).
149
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“[W]hen a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national
origin . . . such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are
subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.”).
150
See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (holding that “a classification . . .
drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” is reviewed under strict
scrutiny).
151
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”).
152
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–44 (2003).
153
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498–506 (1989).
154
See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the legality of
internment of Japanese-Americans); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the
legality of a curfew on individuals of Japanese descent).While Korematsu has not been overruled, it
147
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er standard that governs an Equal Protection challenge to administrative racial
segregation by penal institutions.155 In clarifying only the applicable standard
of review, the Court did not, on the merits, approve the use of race in the penal
context.
Actuarial risk profiles on the rates of recidivism for particular races, national origins, or religions are facial classifications. For example, assessments
of the rates of recidivism for African-Americans, Mexicans, or Muslims constitute facial racial, national origin, and religion classifications, respectively.
Courts therefore would apply strict scrutiny to these risk-assessments. The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence makes clear that the use of race,
national origin, or religion by the government is permissible only in the three
contexts just mentioned: to ensure a diverse student body in higher education,
to remedy past discrimination for which an employer is responsible, and to
respond to public safety emergencies. These exceptions do not include the use
of suspect classifications for general public safety purposes, including criminal
sentencing. 156 Nor does the Court’s ruling that administrative racial segregation in prisons be subject to strict scrutiny offer any hope of the creation of an
additional exception that may encompass the reduction of recidivism. This is
because that case concerned the proper placement or location of individuals
once in prison, as opposed to whether an individual should be in prison in the
first place, a major focus of risk-prediction instruments.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leaves no room for race-conscious
risk-assessment tools. Moreover, in reading separate opinions from individual
Justices, one may count five sitting Justices who would prohibit the use of race
in actuarial risk-assessment instruments. In the 2011 United States Supreme
Court case Buck v. Thaler, Justice Samuel Alito issued a statement respecting
the denial of certiorari, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia. 157 In that case, an African-American man “was sentenced to death based on
the jury’s finding that the State had proved [the man’s] future dangerousness to
society.” 158 At the sentencing phase, a psychologist provided expert testimony
nonetheless has been recognized as wrongly decided. See An Act to Implement Recommendations on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 1(2), 102 Stat. 903 (1988)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a) (2012)) (apologizing for the Japanese internment); Korematsu
v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating Korematsu’s conviction).
155
See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–15 (2005). For more information, see generally
Symposium, The Long Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1 passim (1998).
156
Some may argue that the national security exception to race-based discrimination—identified
most notably in Korematsu—covers threats to public safety, which risk-assessments ostensibly address. In response, this Article would stress that the emergency wartime situation of Korematsu is
qualitatively different than the general public safety concern that animates risk-assessment inquiries.
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (acknowledging that the race-based practices at issue could be constitutionally justify only by the “gravest imminent danger to the public safety”).
157
132 S. Ct. 32, 32 (2011) (statement of Alito, J.).
158
Id. at 33.
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that African-Americans are “statistically more likely than the average person to
engage in crime.” 159 These three Justices called this testimony “bizarre,” “objectionable,” and “offensive.” 160 Nonetheless, these same Justices agreed for
procedural reasons that the denial of certiorari was proper. 161 Justices Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan dissented, asserting that the ”relevant testimony
was inappropriately race-charged” and that further review was warranted. 162
These opinions suggest that at least five Justices seem poised to invalidate the
race-based statistics in sentencing if the proper case reaches the Court. 163
Outside the Supreme Court, legal scholars have come to divergent, and
largely incorrect, positions on whether risk-assessment tools that include suspect characteristics are consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. It has been
suggested that predictive tools that include a suspect characteristic “likely
would be upheld,” citing two cases in which the Supreme Court allowed the
government to use ethnicity in its formal decision-making. 164
But, the cases cited for this proposition involve border agents using ethnicity to identify undocumented immigrants at the border or a border checkpoint. Yet the issue of the border brings a unique set of circumstances that
place these cases in a different category altogether. Indeed, in one of the cases,
the Court clarified that, “Our decision in this case takes into account the special function of the Border Patrol . . . .” 165 As such, border searches in the immigration context cannot be expanded to encompass the use of race in risk
predictions in ordinary settings.
It has been similarly argued that race-conscious risk-assessment tools survive constitutional scrutiny in light of affirmative action principles. 166 Just as
the United States Supreme Court in 2003 in Grutter v. Bollinger allowed colleges and universities to use race as one factor among many in furtherance of
159

Id.
Id. at 33–35.
161
See id. at 35.
162
Id. at 38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Sotomayor also pointed
out that, in a similar case, the state had conceded error, admitting that “it is inappropriate to allow race
to be considered as a factor in our criminal justice system.” Id. at 36 (internal quotes and citation omitted). It is because of that concession that the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a case to the state
court. See generally Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000) (vacating a lower court judgment in light
of the “confession of error” by the Texas Solicitor General).
163
These views suggest that is of no constitutional significance that the risk-assessment may be
driven by statistical evidence. See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding
that a civil rights statute was properly applied to a restaurant that did not serve African-Americans
inside, even where the restaurant had evidence that it would lose business if it served AfricanAmerican customers inside). Accordingly, any basis in data for the risk-assessment does not insulate
the government from judicial review, nor does it soften the searching nature of strict scrutiny. See id.
164
Tonry, supra note 92, at 169 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 873
(1975), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 543 (1976)).
165
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883.
166
Oleson, supra note 134, at 1382–87.
160
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the objective of promoting a diverse student body, it is argued that sentencers
may use race and other suspect characteristics as a factor in risk predictions.167
This view acknowledges that Grutter involved the higher education context,168
but asserts nonetheless that sentencers could surmount strict scrutiny because
the Supreme Court has stated that “the legitimate and compelling state interest
in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.” 169
But the case from which this quote comes, Schall v. Martin, concerned
whether a juvenile could be subject to pretrial detention where the juvenile
posed a “serious risk” of committing a crime before his or her return date. 170
The case therefore exemplifies an exigent public safety exception to the general rule prohibiting the use of race.171 Indeed, the named plaintiff in the case
was detained a total of fifteen days, 172 meaning that the detention was justified
on the basis of the belief that the plaintiff would have committed a crime within fifteen days. Further, the Court explained that the pretrial detention was regulatory, not punitive, 173 which makes the case less applicable to the sentences
that can be facilitated by race-conscious risk-assessment tools. As the case
concerns imminent public safety threats and is not punitive in nature, it is readily distinguishable from the general criminal risk-assessment context. 174
Risk-assessment tools, academics have noted, amount to impermissible
generalizations about individuals that cannot be cured by highlighting the assessments’ statistical nature. 175
In short, race-conscious risk-assessments are at odds with the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 176 The same goes for risk167

See id. at 1377 (“[S]uspect classifications might operate as ‘plus factors,’ allowing judges to
assess risk with greater precision to advance the compelling state interest of public safety. Such an
approach may survive constitutional scrutiny. After all, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court
upheld the affirmative action plan at the University of Michigan’s law school after concluding that
race was a plus factor that advanced the compelling state interest in a diverse student body.”) (internal
citations omitted).
168
See id. at 1382.
169
Id. at 1385 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 264) (alterations and internal quotes omitted).
170
Schall, 467 U.S. at 255.
171
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) (holding that a preventative, regulatory
detention supported by prediction is constitutional only in “special circumstances”).
172
See Schall, 467 U.S. at 258–59.
173
See id. at 271–74.
174
Oleson also cites Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), and De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144,
155 (1960), for the proposition that crime prevention is a compelling state interest. See Oleson, supra
note 134, at 1385. In Terry, however, the Supreme Court only said that “effective crime prevention
and detection” is a “legitimate” state interest. 392 U.S. at 22. And in De Veau, the Court did identify a
“legitimate and compelling state interest, namely, the interest in combatting local crime infesting a
particular industry.” 363 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added). That “particular industry” was unions. See id.
at 145 (describing the provision of the Waterfront Commission Act at issue, which regulated labor
organization activities).
175
See Starr, supra note 18, at 823–827. Part II.B. of this Article asserts that risk-assessment tools
are not narrowly tailored.
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assessments that include classifications on the basis of national origin or religion. The Court has stated unambiguously that race and religion are “factors that
are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process.” 177 This should put to rest any suggestion that these traits are constitutionally appropriate in risk-assessments. To be sure, risk-assessment tools that do not
include suspect characteristics on their face would survive a constitutional challenge even if the application of the tools has a disproportionate effect on certain
races, national origins, or religions. 178 To find that a facially neutral statute violates the Equal Protection Clause, the statute must be motivated by an impermissible purpose.179 Here, there is no indication that risk-assessment tools are driven
by animus or any other illegitimate reason. Rather, these instruments are clearly
used to control crime. As a result, facially neutral risk-assessments would likely
survive a constitutional attack.
b. Sex
Beyond the suspect classes of race, religion, and national origin, the Supreme Court has held that classifications of individuals based on sex must satisfy
intermediate scrutiny in order to comport with the Equal Protection Clause. This
standard requires that the sex-based classification serve an “important” governmental interest and the means chosen be “substantially” related to the further176
In defense of risk-assessment tools, Judge Kopf writes, “if we believe that public safety is or
should be a central goal of our criminal justice system we ought not to ignore the truth–certain characteristics that we have shied away from in the past because we worried too much about vague notions
of ‘equality’ or ‘fairness’ tell us a lot about future danger.” See Kopf, supra note 135. This Article’s
objection to risk-assessment tools is not based on these terms, but on constitutional and statutory law
as well as notions of individual autonomy.
177
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
178
Others have nonetheless criticized risk-assessment tools’ disparate impact on racial minorities.
See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 22, at 145–72; Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66
SMU L. REV. 189, 215 (2013) (“Actuarial tools potentially exacerbate racial disparities because the
typical risk factors used to screen offenders for rehabilitative programming are often proxies for structural inequities disproportionately plaguing historically disadvantaged populations.”); Bernard Harcourt, Risk as Proxy for Race, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1677654, archived at http://perma.cc/8RQM-JLUW (rejecting
the notion that risk-assessments should be used to reduce the prison population, as their use will only
exacerbate existing racial disparities in our criminal justice system); Holder Remarks, supra note 28
(expressing concern that risk-assessment tools on the front-end may “exacerbate unwarranted and
unjust disparities . . . in our criminal justice system and in our society”). For a response, see Shima
Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 192 (2013) (“prediction is
not necessarily discriminatory”); see also id. at 206 (“[F]ind[ing] little support that judges use prior
record as a proxy for race.”); id. at 207 (“[W]hile race and prior record are clearly correlated, it may
be that judges are using race as a proxy for risk rather than risk as a proxy for race.”).
179
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). It is for this reason that one Note has
said, correctly, that “selective incapacitation schemes are probably immune to attack on equal protection grounds as long as they do not utilize suspect classifications as predictive criteria.” Note, supra
note 82, at 519.
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ance of that interest.180 With respect to the first prong of this test, the Court requires “a party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly discriminates on the
basis of sex to advance an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the challenged classification.” 181
In addition to the three “compelling” interests discussed above that are
included a fortiori in this more relaxed standard, the Court has recognized that
a public employer may engage in sex-conscious hiring practices in order to
address general gender discrimination in society, not just gender discrimination
for which the employer is responsible. 182 A risk-assessment, however, cannot
be subsumed under this employer-specific justification for sex-based classifications, and thus would fail intermediate scrutiny.
The United States Supreme Court’s 1962 ruling in Robinson v. California 183 reinforces the impermissibility of including race, national origin, and sex
in risk-assessments. In Robinson, the Court invalidated a state law that subjected an individual to criminal punishment for being a drug addict.184 The Court
held that the mere status of being a drug addict, where the addiction may have
been obtained “innocently or involuntarily,” could not serve as a constitutional
basis for punishment. 185 By the same token, an individual’s status as a member
of a particular race, birth in a specific country, or membership to a given sex, is
wholly involuntarily and thus cannot inform the length or type of punishment.
As race, national origin, and gender receive heightened attention compared to
substance abuse in our constitutional system, sentencing practices that factor
race, national origin, or sex arguably are even more problematic than the law at
issue in Robinson.
c. Socio-Economic Status
Whereas classifications based on race, national origin, religion, and sex
are presumptively unconstitutional,186 different treatment premised on socioeconomic status enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. 187 Classifications
180

See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
Id. (citations omitted).
182
See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (“Reduction of the disparity
in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination” constitutes “an important governmental objective.”) (citations omitted).
183
See 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
184
See id. at 667.
185
Id.
186
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[O]ur case law does reveal a strong presumption that gender classifications are invalid.”); Pers.
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“Certain classifications . . . in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm. A racial classification . . . is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.”).
187
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
181
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based on wealth or poverty are subject to rational basis review, which requires
the government to prove only that the purpose for the classification is “legitimate” and that the means used is “rationally related” to the purpose. 188
Here, risk-assessment tools would be justified on public safety grounds, a
legitimate governmental interest. 189 The utilization of statistical averages that
the poor recidivate at higher levels, and thus present a higher risk of reoffending, is rationally related to public safety.190 Accordingly, socio-economic
status does not seem to offend the constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection,
despite the fact that the SRA bans the use of socio-economic status as a factor
in determining sentencing.
* * *
In sum, Congress, pursuant to the SRA, has forbidden the use of race, sex,
national origin, religion, and socio-economic status in federal sentencing. This
ban covers risk-assessments utilized in sentencing in the federal system. Equal
Protection analysis provides another, independently-sufficient basis for prohibiting the use of race, national origin, religion, and sex in federal and state riskassessments. The result is that five of the seventeen factors analyzed in this
Article should be deemed off-limits in any federal risk-assessment and four of
seventeen in any state risk-assessment (socio-economic status would likely
pass constitutional muster in a state system).
B. Risk-Assessments Ignore Individual Action
This section introduces an additional argument that, if considered, would
call for the removal of these and other factors from predictions of risk in sentencing. This argument has two components. First, it is inappropriate to tie
punishment to group identity and group membership rather than individual
conduct. Second, it is inappropriate to punish the individual for that over
which the individual has no meaningful control. Risk-assessment tools directly
conflict with these dual concepts.
1. Punishment and Individual Action
The principle against individual punishment for group identity is itself the
product of four subsidiary points. First, risk-assessments expressly premise punishment on group identity rather than individual conduct. This creates problems
188

See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–320 (1993).
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102–13 (2003).
190
It should be noted that rational basis is a very forgiving standard. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–
20 (a classification subject to rational basis review “is accorded a strong presumption of validity” and
“must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification”) (citations and internal quotes omitted).
189
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by grounding punishment in something other than the purposes of punishment
described in Part I. Second, risk-assessments, which ascribe a blanket risk profile
to all individuals in a group may not capture the actual, diverse risk profiles of
individuals within the group. Troublingly, all members of a group are branded
with a monolithic risk score. Third, certain factors may be relevant or irrelevant
as a general matter in sentencing, but the risk-assessment tools treat each factor
as categorically relevant because of statistical correlation despite the particularized circumstances of an offender’s situation. Thus, the system fails to distinguish when a trait is actually relevant in an individual case. Fourth, certain other
factors are not premised on conduct—an essential requirement in criminal law—
but rather on the viewpoints or attitudes of the individual, which should not ordinarily give rise to punishment in the absence of action. This creates problems
by punishing an individual’s thoughts and feelings, and not his or her external
conduct. Taken together, these issues raise enormous concerns, both constitutional and otherwise.
a. Personal Conduct
To begin, the law requires that the state must inflict punishment on an individual because of the individual’s conduct, and not group membership. “In
our jurisprudence guilt is personal,” 191 held the Supreme Court; “guilt by association remains a thoroughly discredited doctrine . . . .” 192 Similarly, Justice
Robert H. Jackson wrote, “if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal,” and not associational. 193
Even conspiracy doctrine, 194 which allows individuals to be punished for
knowing participation in certain group behavior, highlights the importance of
guilt attaching to personal conduct and not the disconnected behavior of others. Justice Jackson, acknowledging that “guilt is personal” and admonishing
against resorting to “guilt by association,” wrote that for purposes of conspiracy “personal guilt may be incurred by joining a conspiracy” and that the personal “act of association makes one responsible for the acts of others commit191

Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961).
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 (1959).
193
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting). He said this in the context of the government’s forced exclusion and displacement of individuals of Japanese ancestry in the wake of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, where liberty was restricted because of ancestry alone, not individual
action. See id. If this principle should not apply when the state interests are ostensibly at their maximum, it cannot apply a fortiori to ordinary criminal situations.
194
The Model Penal Code defines conspiracy as follows: “A person is guilty of conspiracy with
another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he (a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage
in conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (b) agrees
to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or
solicitation to commit such crime.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985).
192
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ted in pursuance of the association.” 195 The law punishes the act of joining, not
the mere association with a criminal group. Accordingly, the predicate for punishing an individual for the actions of a group is the individual decision to be
part of the group and specifically a common enterprise.
Risk-assessment tools sever the critical link between personal action and
personal punishment, subjecting the individual to punishment solely for the
group’s propensity to recidivate. 196 As Justice Hugo Black noted, “the fundamental requirement that some action be proved is solidly established even for
offenses most heavily based on propensity, such as attempt, conspiracy, and
recidivist crimes.” 197
b. Blanket Treatment
Worse, risk-assessment tools treat individuals as monolithic members of a
group who pose an identical threat to public safety regardless of their particular or actual danger to society. 198 Indeed, assessors take averages as predictive
measures and then assign these averages to each member of the group.199
Ascribing the same trait or characteristic to all individuals within a group
offends common sense and creates grave constitutional problems. Take, for example, the monolithic treatment of a group based on racial characteristics. The
Supreme Court, in one instance, struck down planned voting districts that “reinforce[d] the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of
their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—
think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
195
Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 433 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphases added).
196
See Sonja Starr, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, at A17 (“The basic
problem is that the risk scores are not based on the defendant’s crime. They are primarily or wholly
based on prior characteristics: criminal history (a legitimate criterion), but also factors unrelated to
conduct.”).
197
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). This concern touches all of
the factors that are used in risk-assessments, because the nature of those assessments is to predict
future criminal behavior in light of present and past conduct; that future crime may never occur. Accordingly, there may not be any legitimate predicate for punishment, other than theoretical chances of
future criminal conduct. It is problematic to premise punishment on numbers and possibility, rather
than action. See id. This concern is particularly heightened where, as here, the factor implicates what
someone thinks or how someone views the world around him.
198
See Daniel S. Goodman, Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 499, 522–23 (1987) (objecting to demographic generalization in the capital context that “classifies defendants on the basis of their affiliation with broad social groups, disregarding the fact that
individual behavior may deviate substantially from average group behavior”).
199
See Jessica Pishko, Punished for Being Poor: The Problem with Using Big Data in the Justice
System, PAC. STANDARD MAG. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/
punished-poor-problem-using-big-data-justice-system-88651/, archived at https://perma.cc/6GP8RQ57?type=pdf (“Data always relies on averages. As a result, some people are bound to behave differently than the data predicts . . . .”).
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at the polls.”200 “[S]uch perceptions,” the Court declared, must be rejected “as
impermissible racial stereotypes.” 201 Similarly, the Court admonished, “racial
bloc voting and minority-group political cohesion never can be assumed . . . .”202
The Court emphasized that, “the individual is important, not his race, his creed,
or his color.”203 Accordingly, if it is impermissible to assume that individuals of
the same race think or vote alike, the assertion that individuals of the same race
will act alike should be condemned as well. Indeed, in another redistricting case,
the Court stated, “[t]he idea is a simple one: At the heart of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government
must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual or national class.”204
These cases support the principle that group membership by itself cannot
be used as a proxy for behavior applicable to all members of the group; individuals within the group are not fungible, undifferentiated parts of a whole.
These cases also point to the need for decision-makers in the criminal justice
system to focus not on group identity but individual behavior.205
Each of the seventeen major characteristics used in risk-assessment tools
would fall short of the low standard that punishment track particularized conduct. This is because actuarial data, by their nature, are averages—and are not
based on the individualized behavior of those within the group.
c. Automatic Relevance
In an actuarial approach, all the factors in an offender’s risk profile are
considered automatically relevant in determining his or her sentence. This approach is problematic in that the individual circumstances of the offender may
justify the consideration of only some factors that may otherwise correlate with
recidivism. Risk-assessment tools do not contemplate such individualization.

200

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
Id.
202
Id. at 653. But see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77
VA. L. REV. 1413, 1468 (1991) (“The assumption that blacks, wherever they reside, tend to be politically cohesive is supported both anecdotally and empirically.”).
203
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
204
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)) (internal quotes and citations omitted); see also
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (“where racial bias is likely to influence a jury, an inquiry
must be made into such bias,” rather than presumed solely from the racial identity of the prospective
juror); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (holding that the state
may not “tak[e] any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes,” such as the stereotype that
jurors would be sympathetic to defendants of the same race).
205
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (concluding that such group-assigned traits
“force[] individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual
abilities”).
201
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In the SRA, Congress stated that four factors—i.e., education and vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibility, and community ties—are “generally inappropriate” as to recommending a term or length of
imprisonment. 206 That is, according to the SRA, these factors generally should
not be relevant in sentencing, but may be relevant in “exceptional cases.” 207
While Congress takes these four factors almost off the table, risk-assessment
tools construe them (and all other factors) as categorically relevant predictors
of risk because of their correlation with recidivism.
Similarly, Congress directed the Commission to determine whether and to
what degree several offender characteristics are “relevant” to sentencing.208 In
response, the Commission found that most of the factors—known as Section
5H factors in reference to a section of the Guidelines Manual—such as age,
mental and emotional condition, physical condition (including drug or alcohol
abuse), and the defendant’s criminal history, are relevant for sentencing. 209
Other Section 5H factors, such as education and vocational skills, family ties
and responsibilities, are “not ordinarily relevant” in sentencing, 210 though they
may be relevant in “exceptional cases.” 211 By contrast, risk-assessment tools
would dictate that all these factors are categorically relevant because they correlate with possible future recidivating.
The Supreme Court’s discussion of Section 5H factors further undercuts
the risk-assessment tools’ one-size-fits-all approach to offender characteristics.
In Koon v. United States, the United States Supreme Court stated that in the
“heartland” of cases, the generally “discouraged” Section 5H factors may not
be relevant in sentencing. Indeed, these factors may be relevant “only if the
factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case
different from the ordinary case where the factor is present.” 212 Again, riskassessment tools lack this nuance, would eliminate the heartland/exceptional
framework, and reduce a factor to a single landscape of actuarial relevance.
206
28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012). The statute lists education and vocational skills as separate characteristics, though for present purposes these two characteristics are consolidated. See id.
207
See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 5K2.0, cmt. n. 3(c).
208
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (the characteristics are: age; education; vocational skills; mental and
emotional condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant’s culpability or to the
extent that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant; physical condition, including drug dependence; previous employment record; family ties and responsibilities; community ties; role in the offense; criminal history; and degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood).
209
See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 5H1.4–.5 (adding that “[s]ubstance abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime,” and clarifying that employment record
“may be relevant in determining the conditions of probation or supervised release,” but is “not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted”).
210
See id. § 5H1.6 (clarifying that family responsibilities “that are complied with may be relevant
to the determination of the amount of restitution or fine”).
211
See id. § 5K2.0, cmt. n. 3(c).
212
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996).
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In short, the value of risk-assessment tools is confined to separating groups
from one another; learning, for example, that one group on average is more likely to recidivate than another group. This crude, blunt measure says very little,
however, about how individuals within the groups will perform and how decision-makers should respond to such unrefined predictions of performance.
d. Absence of Conduct
Risk-assessments may also subject individuals to higher punishment
simply because the individual may think in anti-social ways. But one who has
not acted in breach of the criminal law should not be subject to criminal punishment at all, even if one has thoughts or perspectives that are hostile to others
or to society. Criminal laws generally have two constituent components: an
evil mind and an evil hand. 213 To be punished, an individual’s evil mind must
manifest itself through evil action of some kind. Punishing an individual for
possessing an evil mind alone—that is, views or attitudes seen as aggressive or
hostile—would collapse the twin requirements of criminal law and eliminate
the essential requirement that the evil mind induce some kind of evil action.214
Justice Black, for one, decried this treatment as “obnoxious,” noting in Powell
v. Texas that the “mental element is not simply one part of the crime but may
constitute all of it”—a situation that is “universally sought to be avoided in our
criminal law.” 215
Moreover, our tradition of individual freedom in America allows a person
to select from the vast universe of ideas or attitudes and act on these ideas
without government interference, provided that he or she stays within the limits of the law. 216 Relatedly, unorthodox views or perspectives should be valued
213

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952).
One may suggest that hate crimes are a category of criminal laws that prohibit “evil mind,”
that is, selecting a victim on the basis of the victim’s disfavored traits. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1993) (upholding a hate crimes statute despite its First Amendment implications); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992) (invalidating a hate crimes statute on
First Amendment grounds). But valid hate crimes statutes are still predicated on action, though the
victim may have been selected for the action on the basis of a protected characteristic. The Matthew
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, for example, makes it unlawful for anyone
to “willfully cause[] bodily injury” or “attempt to cause bodily injury to any person,” because of an
individual’s race, color, religion or national origin. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012).
215
Powell, 392 U.S. at 543 (Black, J., concurring); see also Williamson v. United States, 184
F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950) (“[I]t is . . . difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to
protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so
fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it . . . .”); Holder Remarks,
supra note 28 (“[C]riminal sentencing should not be based on . . . the possibility of a future crime that
has not taken place . . . .”).
216
See Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1437 (1979) (objecting to the functional
214
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in a democratic society that depends on competing viewpoints and ways of
life, subject again to the same criminal boundaries. Different views enrich and
deepen our society. Accordingly, an anti-social lens through which the individual sees the world should not inform an individual’s sentence.
* * *
These arguments challenge the centerpiece of risk-assessment tools: the
fact that risk predictions—and the possibility of enhanced punishment—are
premised on the basis of an individual’s group identity or membership. There
are ample reasons, grounded in the SRA, Commission conclusions, Court pronouncements, and the utilitarian purposes of punishment, to doubt whether
such group-based determinations are a valid means by which to justify custodial decisions for the individual. 217
2. Punishment and Control
Risk-assessment tools raise additional concerns because individuals may
be a member of a group for no fault of their own and may be unable to change
whether or not to be in the group. In this respect, the tools may demand punishment for a group identity over which the individual has no meaningful control. 218
Both retributionists and utilitarians believe punishment should be imposed on the guilty. Rawls explains that “retributionists . . . insist[] . . . that no
man can be punished unless he is guilty, that is, unless he has broken the
law.” 219 Rawls adds that “utilitarians agree that punishment is to be inflicted
only for the violation of law.” 220 It is important to emphasize that “guilt” in this
inducement of punishment where “the induced behavior falls in a zone in which there is a strong social commitment to protecting an individual’s private and personal choices”).
217
One may claim that this subsection is, at bottom, a complaint that risk-assessments involve
group-based, rather than individual-based, statistics, and that this concern dissipates if and when riskassessments include more refined, intra-group data. The following argument would apply to riskassessments even if the data were specified for each individual offender. See Coffee, supra note 23, at
1008 (commenting on “the jurisprudential issues that will remain even if the methodology employed
is as precise and narrow as possible”).
218
This point was raised recently by Attorney General Holder. See Holder Remarks, supra note
28 (“[Criminal sentencing] should not be based on unchangeable factors that a person cannot control
. . . .”).
219
Rawls, supra note 31, at 7.
220
Id. Some posit that utilitarianism would justify the punishment of the innocent. See, e.g.,
MOORE, supra note 31, at 93 (“The main problem with the pure utilitarian theory of punishment is
that it potentially sacrifices the innocent in order to achieve a collective good.”). But at least some
utilitarians have disavowed this charge. See, e.g., Binder & Smith, supra note 70, at 118–19 (acknowledging that policies justifying punishment of the innocent “follow logically from the premises
of utilitarianism,” but clarifying that “utilitarian penology cannot endorse punishment of the innocent”). As this Article addresses itself to the use of risk-assessments for purposes of determining
whether imprisonment is an appropriate sanction and ascertaining the proper length of imprisonment,
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sense is the technical breach of the law, or a descriptive fact. It is not necessarily a value judgment as to the qualitative nature of the breach, which words associated with retribution, such as “blameworthiness,” “desert,” and “moral responsibility,” tend to conjure up. Accordingly, both theories share the belief
that punishment must follow guilt.
But not all who technically violate the law are punished. A hallmark of
any legitimate legal system is that government may punish only decisions over
which an individual can exercise sufficient agency. 221 As the Supreme Court
has recognized, “It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as
belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil.”222 Justice Byron White
explained that, “The criminal law proceeds on the theory that defendants have
a will and are responsible for their actions” and that individuals who “have
chosen to engage in conduct so reprehensible and injurious to others . . . must
be punished . . . .” 223 In other words, the criminal law punishes an individual
for choices—not thoughts—that undermine and impose harm on the public
order. 224
Our criminal law punishes only those individuals who choose to violate
the law. It does not, therefore, punish those who cannot make moral choices for
themselves, such as children, the intellectually disabled, or the insane. These
individuals are considered categorically ineligible for criminal sanction because they cannot be “blameworthy in mind”; they lack the requisite mental
capacity to meaningfully choose between good and evil.225 Children, for example, “are exempted from criminal liability to the extent that they have not
yet developed into autonomous adults, and therefore lack the cognitive, emotional, and practical capacity to make rational decisions for which they are
morally accountable.” 226 The intellectually disabled “do not act with the level
this Article assumes that the offender is guilty. It therefore avoids any dispute regarding whether utilitarianism would subject the innocent to criminal sanction.
221
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33, 39 (1969) (explaining that “rules that require
conduct beyond the powers of the affected party” not only “result in a bad system of law,” but also
“result[] in something that is not properly called a system of law at all” and, further stating, “a law
which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void and no law”); see also California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[An] emphasis on culpability in sentencing
decisions has long been reflected in Anglo-American jurisprudence.”).’
222
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
223
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (White, J., concurring); see also Booth
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (suggesting that a sentencer cannot consider that which has no
“bearing on the defendant’s personal responsibility and moral guilt”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
224
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *2 (describing criminal violations as “public wrongs,”
“which affect the whole community, considered as a community”) (emphases omitted).
225
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
226
Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 848–49
(2011); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (recognizing the “diminished culpabil-
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of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.” 227 And the insane, who “may not be regarded as moral agents, that is,
persons . . . are incapable of making choices that count as such because of impaired reasoning and judgment.” 228
In short, “It is generally agreed ‘that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.’” 229 As the aforementioned examples show, certain individuals lack “personal culpability” and
therefore should not be criminally sanctioned.
In contrast to this bedrock principle, risk-assessment instruments call for
punishment without the individual choice that is ordinarily a prerequisite to
criminal punishment. 230 Indeed, risk-assessment tools subject a defendant to
increased punishment because of immutable attributes, including race, sex, and
national origin, 231 traits over which the defendant has no control and possesses
by pure accident of birth.
The utilitarian theories of punishment generally do not support basing
sentencing decisions on such factors. Deterrence theory holds that the offender
and others in society should be incentivized to conform his or her behavior to
the law. The incentive is meaningless if it is applied to a factor that the indiity of juveniles” in finding unconstitutional the imposition of capital punishment on individuals who
were under eighteen at the time of offense); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (stating that “less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime
committed by an adult,” and further stating that “[the] irresponsible conduct [of a juvenile] is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (“Our
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults.”).
227
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306, 316 (2002) (“[O]ur society views mentally retarded
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”). While the cases in this and the
previous footnote arose in the context of capital sentences, they nonetheless stand for the unassailable
proposition that diminished mental capacity diminishes culpability. See id.; supra note 226.
228
Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 262–63 (1987) (discussing individuals who possess “inadequate capacities for making judgments and exercising choice”); see also Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1004 (1932) (“Insanity, which robs one of the
power to make intelligent choice between good and evil, must negative criminal responsibility if criminality rests upon moral blameworthiness.”). Relatedly, Christopher Slobogin argues that individuals
who experience “imperviousness” to criminal punishment—that is, who cannot be deterred from
breaching the criminal law—may be subject to preventative civil detention. Christopher Slobogin, A
Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003); see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 358 (1997) (explaining that civil confinement is permissible for “those suffer from a volitional
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control”).
229
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
230
See Goodman, supra note 200, at 521 (“To allow a criminal defendant’s sentence to be determined to any degree by his unchosen membership in a given race or class denies the very premise of
self-determination upon which our criminal justice system is built. It raises the threat that defendants
will be sentenced not on the basis of their personal merit or conduct, but on the basis of their ‘status.’”).
231
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting race, national
origin, and sex are immutable characteristics).
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vidual has no actual or meaningful ability to change. That is, incentivizing
conduct “depends on the mutability of the characteristic that forms the basis of
classification.” 232 Where a trait is immutable—unchangeable—it obviously
cannot be influenced to change by the criminal law. The deterrence rationale
thus cannot justify punishment for those factors that the individual cannot effectively change.
A similar analysis follows under a rehabilitation model of criminal punishment. Rehabilitation serves as an opportunity for the offender to change his
or her path such that he or she may be less likely to re-offend. Rehabilitative
programs and activities must be directed towards that which the individual can
improve. But there are some characteristics that rehabilitative efforts cannot
affect because they are not susceptible to individual control. For example, an
offender will still possess the same race and national origin no matter what
programs he or she completes. As with deterrence, rehabilitation jurisprudence
rejects sentencing based on these immutable factors.
By contrast, the incapacitation rationale would appear to cut the other
way and would not be vulnerable to any such control-based limitations. Under
pure incapacitation theory, individuals could be isolated from society if they
presented a higher risk of re-offending, regardless of the individuals’ ability to
change the grounds for the higher risk profile. For example, for a proponent of
incapacitation, it is irrelevant whether an African-American cannot change his
or her race; what matters instead is whether public safety would be served by
punishment. Accordingly, the principal point of this subsection— that riskassessment tools include only those characteristics over which the offender has
meaningful control—would seemingly have no purchase in a purely incapacitational sentencing regime.
But, as the categorical exclusion of some individuals demonstrates, our
criminal justice system demands that criminal punishment be premised on
those individuals who have the capacity of choice.
The constitutional requirement of proportional sentencing reinforces the
concept that criminal punishment cannot roam beyond that for which the individual is responsible. As the Supreme Court said over a century ago, “it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.” 233 To the extent that the incapacitation of an individual ven232

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 154–55 (1980) (“[C]lassifications geared to
characteristics it is not within the power of the individual to change will not be amenable to immediate
and innocent explanation in terms of altering the classifying characteristic’s incidence.”); Samuel A.
Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 670 (2001) (“It is doubtful that
classifications based on immutable characteristics can or will often be relevant to government classifications as to which deterrence is the underlying goal.”).
233
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 377 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A society must punish those who transgress its rules.
When the offense is severe, the punishment should be of proportionate severity.”).
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tures into such territory, the sanction would lose its character as a criminal one
and could only be supported as a civil one.234 In short, while incapacitation, on
its own, may allow for punishment without regard to volitional capacity, the
Constitution and Supreme Court both suggest that, in our system, such capacity is necessary for criminal sanction.
C. Risk-Assessments Undermine Individual Autonomy
The first section in this Part addressed the mismatch between riskassessment tools and individual conduct, and the second the mismatch between
risk-assessment tools and that which the individual can control. The focus of
this section is the mismatch between risk-assessment tools and the capacity of
individuals to change over time. It establishes the role of individual autonomy
in utilitarian penology, and then argues how risk-assessment tools fail to account for individual autonomy.
1. Individual Autonomy and Utilitarianism
Though an individual may change in some respects from one time to the
next, the criminal law presupposes the continuity of an individual’s identity,
such that it would be appropriate to hold the individual responsible at a second
moment for actions taken at a prior moment. As law professor Joel Feinberg
writes, “All of our ordinary notions of responsibility . . . presuppose a relation
of personal identity between earlier and later stages of the same self.” 235 Philosopher John Locke similarly noted that individual consciousness “extends
itself beyond present existence to what is past” and thus may be held “accountable” for actions both past and present. 236 Because of this unity of past and
present, Locke asserts that “a sentence shall be justified by the consciousness
all persons shall have, that they themselves, in what bodies soever they appear
. . . .” 237
In criminal law, individual identity must be seen as constant for the
threshold question of who to punish, as this question is interested in attribution
or traceability of actions and related harms. 238 Indeed, offenders must bear re234

See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (holding that civil commitment cannot be made
without some inquiry into the individual’s lack of control); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
(categorizing as civil, and upholding, a state statute authorizing the commitment of a sex offender who
could not control his dangerousness).
235
Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 478 (1983).
236
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. II, ch. xxvii, § 26, at
276 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1689).
237
Id.
238
This first question corresponds with the first question and answer posed by Rawls in his seminal discussion of rules: “Why was J put in jail yesterday?” Rawls, supra note 31, at 5. Answer: “Be-
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sponsibility for their previous criminal actions and any resultant public harm—
no one else should be forced to bear it for them. Moreover, the criminal law
would unravel if an individual could avoid responsibility simply by claiming
that he or she was sufficiently changed.
But individual identity can change. And in determining an appropriate
punishment, the criminal law may consider these changes in the individual.
Indeed, the utilitarian theories of punishment all assume that the individual
identity can change with time and support the flexibility of punishment in light
of these changes.
In particular, specific deterrence—incentivizing the offender to not recidivate—suggests that an individual who is sentenced, at time-x, for a criminal
act will be able to determine, at time-y, that the consequences of the criminal
action are not worth whatever profits it obtained. If the individual did not have
the capacity to deliberate and engage in this cost-benefit analysis, and if the
individual was unable to arrive at a different conclusion than the initial decision, specific deterrence would be meaningless. This is why Plato suggested
that “rational punishment . . . is desirous that the man who is punished, and he
who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again,” “thereby
clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught.” 239 Deterrence theory
thus presupposes that an individual can acquire “virtue”—here, acting lawfully. 240 In short, an individual can change, and change for the better.
Under an incapacitation rationale, incarceration is legitimate only insofar
as, and only for long as, the individual must be segregated from society. After
that point, incarceration cannot be justified for incapacitation reasons. In other
words, the incapacitation theory assumes that the offender is able to become
less of a threat to society such that custodial detention is no longer appropriate.
In utilitarian jurisprudence, rehabilitation most strongly supports the idea
that individuals can change. Rehabilitation rests on the promise that an individual’s ability to live lawfully will be heightened over time by programs and treatment. It presumes that the individual is capable of making progress over time.
In other words, utilitarian theories of punishment all suggest that people
are capable of some internal shift, and may exercise choice in achieving this
progress. Our current sentencing regime recognizes this as well. Two examples: first, inmates in the federal system may obtain an earlier release by earn-

cause he robbed the bank at B.” Id. In other words, “a particular man is punished, rather than some
other man, because he is guilty, and he is guilty because he broke the law . . . .” Id. at 6.
239
PLATO, APOLOGUE OF PROTAGORAS, in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 145 (B. Jowett trans.,
New York, Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1892) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
240
The punishment imposed on the individual may also impress upon members of the public,
with greater force, that the costs of the crime are not worth its benefits, where this enhanced message
again is suggestive of dynamism.

2015]

Actuarial Predictive Instruments in Sentencing

713

ing “good time” credits.241 These credits encourage positive behavior; by offering them, the federal criminal justice system demonstrates that it understands
that inmates may take the carrot and exhibit favored behavior.242 Second, in the
federal system, 97.2% of inmates are sentenced for less than life terms, meaning that this percentage of inmates will be eligible for release back into their
communities. 243 These sentences indicate that virtually all inmates, despite initially needing punishment, will at some point be deemed able to live in society
without being a threat to public safety, and able to display the skills and tools
necessary to stay within legal boundaries.
In sum, ideals of utilitarianism and individual autonomy support the notion that individuals may change and make positive choices. Individuals can
and do change.
2. Individual Autonomy and Risk-Assessments
Predictions of future criminal behavior also have a temporal component:
they consist of attempts to forecast, at sentencing, the future dangerousness of
the individual at release. But risk-assessment tools discount the potential of the
individual to develop over time, undermining the individual’s autonomy. That
is, risk-assessment tools are stuck at sentencing: they assess an individual’s
likelihood of future dangerousness by examining various characteristics that
might change over time.
This creates undeniable tension between actuarial techniques and individual autonomy. This conflict has been highlighted: “To imprison a person because of the crimes he is expected to commit denies him the opportunity to
choose to avoid those crimes . . . .” 244 “[R]espect for individual autonomy,” it
is added, “requires recognition of the possibility that an individual can choose
to refute any prediction about himself.” 245 In a similar point, it is argued that a
restraint on liberty that is based on prediction “precludes the individual from
taking steps to defeat the prediction and make the ‘right’ moral choice,” “assume[s] a fixed future,” and “destroy[s] the opportunity for individual selfdetermination—precluding the possibility that individuals can demonstrate

241
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2012) (allowing for 54 days of “good time” credit per year, for inmates with sentences of at least one year).
242
Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 482 (2010) (explaining that the credits offer an “incentive”
for inmates to comply with prison rules and that the credits “reward[] and reinforce[] a readily identifiable period of good behavior”).
243
Sentences Imposed, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_
inmate_sentences.jsp, archived at https://perma.cc/GNK6-UKJD?type=image (last updated Jan. 24,
2015) (providing federal prison statistics based on data from December, 2014).
244
Underwood, supra note 218, at 1414.
245
Id.
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their moral goodness and choose a course of action that differs from the prediction.” 246
In our system, to assign criminal responsibility, individual identity must
remain constant; yet as noted above, individuals may change over time. This
reality complicates the business of risk prediction. A law professor notes that,
“[a]s time passes, increasingly weak psychological connections might exist with
the past dangerous criminal,” which may “result in needlessly confining a presently nondangerous person.” 247 From this perspective, “The accuracy of dangerousness predictions has an inverse relationship to the length of commitment or
confinement.” 248 In other words, recidivism can decline with time. 249
The recent 2011 United States Supreme Court case of Pepper v. United
States illustrates these principles. 250 James Pepper was convicted of violating a
federal drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and sentenced to twenty-four
months in prison 251 The Supreme Court recounted that, “At the time of his initial sentencing in 2004, Pepper was a 25-year-old drug addict who was unemployed, estranged from his family, and had recently sold drugs as part of a
methamphetamine conspiracy . . . .”252 But, when Pepper had been resentenced
in 2009, the Court observed, “Pepper had been drug-free for nearly five years,
had attended college and achieved high grades, was a top employee at his job
and slated for a promotion, had re-established a relationship with his father,
and was married and supporting his wife’s daughter.” 253
Pepper’s “exemplary” 254 post-sentence conduct shows individual autonomy in action. Importantly, the Court noted that Pepper’s transformation
“sheds light on the likelihood that he will engage in future criminal conduct
246

Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 364 (2014). As Daskal makes this argument in the context of noncustodial restraints on liberty, the force of this point is heightened with respect to the custodial restraints,
such as pre-trial detention or post-conviction imprisonment, that are the subject of this Article. See id.
247
Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 423, 443 (1990)
(“[I]f the person subject to punishment has enough in common with the offender . . . then a plausible
moral foundation exists for the later person’s punishment.”). See generally Steven Mazie, The Waiting
Game, ECONOMIST (May 29, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/05/
death-row, archived at http://perma.cc/W4PE-PYUA (discussing the disconnect between the individual and the “past self” in the context of sentencing).
248
Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future Dangerousness” Catches the
Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35
AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 152 (2008).
249
See Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent
Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 199 (2010) (“[R]ecidivism rates among non-violent offenders decline with the passage of time.”).
250
131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011).
251
Id. at 1236.
252
Id. at 1242.
253
Id.
254
Id.
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. . . .” 255 For the Court, the defendant’s behavioral progress over time informed
the prediction of future criminality.
Risk-assessment tools, however, would have instructed a court to sentence Pepper more harshly (e.g., imprisonment or a longer term of imprisonment) because of his younger age, substance abuse, unemployment, and weak
family ties—which all indicate a higher risk of recidivating. 256 It is true that a
new risk profile may be calculated at different stages of the criminal justice
process, such as bail-setting to sentencing, and thus changes in the individual
may be reflected in newer risk profile. But, as Pepper’s situation shows, certain
traits are fixed and even revised risk scores will build-in the higher risk predictions called for by these traits and thereby point to a greater form and/or length
of sanction. The individual’s ability to advance is held back at each stage, a
Zeno’s paradox in which the individual’s ability to reach a sufficient point of
personal development is continuously frustrated.
Prison, unfortunately, is a difficult place that compromises this personal
transformation. Indeed, Congress itself has expressed that the penal environment is not conducive to rehabilitation. The SRA flatly states that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” 257 Yet risk-assessments tools often call for an offender to be detained—
sometimes for lengthy periods—because he or she risks recidivating. “Riskassessment tools that support custodial detention could not only impede the
individual’s development, but could even send him or her in the opposite direction. Empirical evidence bears this out. For example, when low-risk defendants
are “detained pretrial, they are more likely to commit new crimes both in the
near and long term,” and that this cycle “carries enormous costs—both human
and financial.” 258
The individual’s subsequent failure to reform—arguably facilitated by
sentences supported by risk-assessment tools—would be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Furthermore, that assisted failure would in turn validate riskassessments for being “right” about the analyzed individual. Risk-assessments
minimize the criminal justice system’s interest in investing in an offender
deemed statistically high-risk. 259 The sentencer not only actively impairs the
255

Id.
See Oleson, supra note 134, at 1351.
257
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012).
258
LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL
FOR PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2 (Nov. 2013), available at http://arnoldfoundation.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5TMA583F.
259
See Underwood, supra note 218, at 1417 (“[T]he decisionmaker [is] discouraged from acting
to improve the chances of the people identified as bad risks. A decisionmaker who selects and excludes individuals on the basis of their predicted behavior tends to view the prediction as a fixed attribute of the applicant, and tends not to consider ways of intervening to change the situation.”).
256
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offender’s prospects for development by choosing to detain him or her, but
then neglects his or her development because the offender is too risky and thus
“not worth it.” Risk-assessments can thus “track”—grouping individuals based
on lower expectations of future performance, and providing diminished support in light of those expectations—criminal defendants under the cover of
statistical rationality. 260
In acknowledging that numbers accurately capture individuals’ rates of
recidivism, it must be cautioned that numbers don’t tell the whole story:
[T]he system spews out on the back-end of convictions nothing better than what’s taken in on the front end. It would clearly suggest
that people of color are more prone to be criminals in the first place,
and more prone to recidivism afterward. That’s the story the numbers tell. But the numbers are only as good as the input.
More young black men are recidivists because more black men are
arrested, even though there is evidence that they don’t commit more
crimes than white men. They just get arrested more, because they
are who the police spend their time arresting. This gives rise to an
internal community spiral, missing fathers (because they’re in prison), poor education, poor job prospects, etc. Toss in a criminal conviction and ask empiricism why they aren’t being hired for wellpaying jobs at IBM. 261
Individuals can beat the odds, averages notwithstanding, as the Pepper
case illustrates. Moreover, we should want individuals to beat the odds. 262 We
should want individuals to be productive. We should seek to help facilitate the
development of the individual such that he or she can be part of mainstream
society upon release. 263 In fact, this is imperative because almost all offenders
will be released back into our communities. 264
260

See Daniel J. Losen, Silent Segregation in our Nation’s Schools, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
517, 518–20 (1999) (discussing similar problems with school segregation); Angelia Dickens, Note,
Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: How Tracking Has Resegregated America’s Public Schools,
29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 469, 475–78 (1996) (commenting on the lower opportunities and
resources for and lower expectations of tracked students).
261
Scott H. Greenfield, Numbers Don’t Lie (But People Do), SIMPLE JUSTICE (Aug. 11, 2014,
1:05 PM), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2014/08/11/numbers-dont-lie-but-people-do/, archived at http://
perma.cc/GZL8-N8V4.
262
See Wolff, supra note 91, at 1416 (“For any sentence shorter than life imprisonment, from the
day an offender enters prison, the system should be preparing for his or her release by developing a
reentry plan that will put that person back in the community with enough support to reduce the chances of reoffending.”).
263
See Dawinder Sidhu, We Don’t Need a ‘Right to Be Forgotten.’ We Need a Right to Evolve.,
NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120181/america-shouldnt-evenneed-right-be-forgotten, archived at http://perma.cc/HDG6-HRCC (“Social support can enhance a
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It is true that, as a general matter, individual development, typified by rehabilitation, has fallen out of favor in American sentencing. 265 But Congress
codified rehabilitation as a purpose of sentencing in the SRA 266 and as such
indicated that transformative considerations should inform, at least to some
degree, sentencing in the federal courts. That is, individual progress over time
may no longer be a dominant goal of punishment, but it cannot be disregarded
wholesale. The Supreme Court has recognized, for example, juveniles’
“heightened capacity for change,” a capacity that exists, albeit perhaps not to
the same degree, for adults. 267 Given this, the possibility that risk-assessment
tools might stunt the capacity for exercising choice is troubling, and should
perhaps temper their use.
This section’s argument is of course utilitarian in nature. It need not recruit retribution as a side constraint on utilitarianism. This is because the utilitarian theory recognizes changeover time and it is the offender’s change in
threat to public safety that marks the beginning and end of the applicable
timeframe. He or she is a sufficient danger to public safety at time-x, warranting punishment, but his or her threat-level is diminished at time-y, such that
punishment is no longer warranted and release is appropriate. That change is
in—and can only be attributed to—the offender.
* * *
In summary, risk-assessment tools that predict recidivism through group
characteristics are problematic for three independent reasons: first, the Equal
Protection Clause would prohibit, and the SRA expressly forbids, certain factors from use in sentencing. Second, even if these factors are not prohibited on
constitutional or statutory grounds, risk-assessment tools premise sentencing
decisions on group identity rather than on individual action or that which the
individual can meaningfully control. Third, risk-assessment tools require that
the individual be construed as a static entity predisposed to re-offend, without
regard to the individual’s prospects for change, and with the effect of making
the individual’s development a more distant possibility.

person’s prospects for employment and contributions to their families, their communities, and the
workforce.”).
264
See Sentences Imposed, supra note 251 (noting that 97.2% of inmates are eligible for release).
265
See Tapia v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011).
266
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012). Outside of Congress, the model is still viable. See Editorial,
Writing Off Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, at A24 (suggesting that long-term imprisonment for
low-level drug offenses “ignores the potential for rehabilitation”).
267
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
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IV. APPLYING LIMITS TO RISK-ASSESSMENT TRAITS
This Part applies the three principles enumerated in Part III to the major
factors used in risk-assessment tools. Section A analyzes seventeen major riskassessment factors and argues that each of these traits should be off-limits for
risk-assessment purposes. Section B responds to potential criticisms to this
argument.
A. Analyzing Risk-Assessment Factors
1. Traits Prohibited by Law
The first step is rather straightforward: it is impermissible under the Equal
Protection Clause to use race, sex, national origin, or religion as a factor in
risk-assessment tools. The use of these traits is presumptively unconstitutional,
and the limited permissible purposes carved out by the Supreme Court, including responding to imminent public safety emergencies, cannot be read to encompass a general public safety goal. 268 In addition, the SRA, by its own
terms, states that the federal sentencing policy shall be “entirely neutral” as to
these four factors as well as to socio-economic status.269 Five of the seventeen
may therefore be comfortably removed from consideration in predictive instruments.
2. Traits Outside Individual Conduct and Control
Risk-assessment tools rely on data that specific groups recidivate at certain rates and assign the same risk profile to each member of the group. But as
discussed above, this approach raises significant concerns by treating each individual in a group as a monolithic entity. These concerns apply to each of the
seventeen factors, which are all premised on averages and do not take into account individualized variations within a group.
In addition to a prediction of recidivism, risk assessment tools assign a future dangerousness score to an individual solely because the individual has a
characteristic that is shared with others in the group. But as discussed above,
the individual may not have any control over the characteristics that form the
basis for the group membership. Subjecting an individual to punishment for
immutable traits severs the fundamental link between punishment and individual conduct that the criminal law demands.
Race, sex, national origin, and age. Traits that the individual cannot control include race, sex, national origin, and age. The inability of the individual
to control his or her race, sex, national origin, or age requires no elaboration.
268
269

See supra notes 202–206 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012).
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Criminal behavior of family members, family rearing practices, family
structure. Offenders also cannot control traits relating to family: the criminality
of family members, family rearing practices (i.e., “lack of supervision and affection, abuse”), 270 and family structure (i.e., “separation from parents, broken
home, foster parents”). 271 Individuals cannot, of course, choose their family
members (outside of marriage and children). Assigning blame, therefore, because of the conduct of a family member is fundamentally improper—and our
law recognizes this. For example, the Supreme Court has admonished that punishing a child for the actions of his or her parents is “illogical,” “unjust,” and
“contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”272 Accordingly,
individuals should not be punished for the actions, moral failures, or the abuse
or neglect visited upon them by others, since the individual cannot control others’ actions or the existence of the family relationship with these others. True,
an individual may be able to control entry of some individuals, namely spouses
and children, into the family. But risk-assessment tools do not hold individuals
accountable for the actions of only these family members, but does so for all
family members including those whose family membership is beyond the individual’s control.
Pre-adult criminal behavior, mental illness, and substance abuse. Forbidden traits also should include pre-adult criminality. The Supreme Court has
held that criminal responsibility attaches when the defendant can meaningfully
exercise choice. According to the Court, the diminished capacity of children
undermines the penological value of a defendant’s pre-adult actions. 273 Relatedly, the Supreme Court has instructed that a defendant’s mental illness or substance abuse may diminish the defendant’s culpability, though these factors
indicate a higher likelihood of recidivating. 274 (Though the Court, in the same
breath, has cautioned that such illness or abuse may also lead jurors to believe
that such a defendant poses a heightened risk to public safety and therefore
requires even greater penal attention). 275 While these factors are a double-edge
270

Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What
Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 597 (1996).
271
Id.
272
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
273
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835
(1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982).
274
See Gendreau et al., supra note 278, at 583; Oleson, supra note 134, at 1362–63; see also
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 5H1.4 (“Substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased
propensity to commit crime.”).
275
See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1410 (2011) (evidence about mental illness and substance abuse is not “clearly mitigating” because a jury may conclude that the defendant “was simply
beyond rehabilitation,” suggesting further that such evidence can be a “two-edged sword”) (internal
quotes and citation omitted); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 293 (2007) (mitigating evidence
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sword in terms of culpability and future dangerousness, risk-assessment tools
seek to have it only one way, treating the factors as categorically aggravating.
To make either of these traits per se aggravating, despite the fact that they may
cut either way, essentially eliminates individualized determinations as to the
appropriateness of criminal sanction.
Socio-economic status. Individuals are not able to glide at will through
different socio-economic classes. In fact, the reality of economic stagnation
and impoverishment signal the exact opposite: many individuals are effectively
stuck in their social situations and physical locations.276 For example, sociological analyses show that individuals in areas of concentrated urban poverty
have great difficulty achieving social mobility. 277 Despite the fact that individuals may not be able to meaningfully control their socio-economic status, riskassessments treat this status as categorically relevant because of its high correlation with recidivism. As this factor would subject the individual to higher
punishment on the basis of conditions the individual cannot meaningfully control, the factor must be disregarded in risk-assessments, regardless of its statistical validity.
Criminal companions. The “criminal companions” factor is also related to
socio-economic status. Some individuals, because of their depressed economic
state, may not have the ability or resources to “extricate themselves from
a criminogenic setting.”278 Indeed, the salience of having criminal companions,
another major factor that correlates with future dangerousness, is questionable
for two reasons. First, as the conspiracy doctrine makes clear, whether an individual’s companions engage (or don’t engage) in criminal action means little
for legal purposes, unless the individual himself or herself signs on to the criminal enterprise. To the extent that an individual may be held accountable for the
criminality of others, it is because the individual has exercised choice in
whether or not to join the conspiracy. An individual may not, without more, be
subject to punishment merely on the basis of associating with others. 279 It was

that included evidence that the defendant had depression and abused drugs “tended to confirm the
State’s evidence of future dangerousness as well as lessen his culpability for the crime”).
276
See Fareed Zakaria, The Downward Path of Upward Mobility, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-downward-path-of-upward-mobility/2011/11/09/gIQ
AegpS6M_story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/AQ39-GTZX?type=pdf (“[O]ver the past decade,
growing evidence shows pretty conclusively that social mobility has stalled in this country.”).
277
See Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Unconstitutionality of Urban Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 23–
27 (2012) (discussing the limited physical and social mobility of individuals living in areas of concentrated urban poverty).
278
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
279
It is true that a standard condition of supervised release is a restriction on associational rights.
See 28 C.F.R. § 2.204(a)(5)(v) (2014) (“The releasee shall not associate with a person who has a criminal record without permission from the supervision officer.”). It should be noted, however, that this
qualified right of association is connected to, and justified on the basis of, an individual’s instant of-
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Tocqueville who recognized that “[t]he right of association . . . appears . . . almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator
can attack it without impairing the foundations of society.” 280
Second, individuals who live in areas of concentrated poverty unjustifiably face the prospect of an adverse risk profile—and the harsher punishment
that typically follows. These individuals, due to their limited physical mobility,
may be stuck—they have little choice but to associate with individuals around
them, even those who are criminals. But risk-assessment tools fail to recognize
these problems and would ensnare anyone in or around an area with criminals.
This remains true even for individuals who do not engage in the critical step of
affirmatively supporting the criminal activity or inclinations of others.
Education and vocational skills, employment record, and community ties.
In the SRA, Congress declared that the following factors are generally inappropriate in determining whether and how long to imprison an offender: “education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities,
and community ties . . . .” 281 There may be special circumstances in which the
general rule does not govern and these factors do become relevant in sentencing, as the Supreme Court stated in Koon. 282 But risk-assessment tools would
make these factors categorically relevant in sentencing irrespective of the circumstances of the individual, thus offending both Congress’s statutory determination and the Court’s ruling in Koon.
Religion and anti-social attitudes and personality. Similarly, riskassessment tools should not rely on religion or anti-social attitudes or personality. Criminal responsibility cannot exist when an individual does not act, and
as a result cannot be based on what or how someone thinks. Religious views
and anti-social sentiments are intrinsically internal in nature and should remain
immune from criminal punishment, unless those thoughts indicate an actual or
imminent threat to public safety. 283 Moreover, an individual’s ideology, attitude, and life decisions, such as whether to get married or pursue higher education, are the type of “personal and private choices” that are reserved for the
individual. 284 Choices that reflect an individual’s autonomy should not open up
the individual to punishment, provided that the decisions remain within the
bounds of the law.
Adult criminal history. The final characteristic of the seventeen is adult
criminal history. It is true that adult criminal history, as with all other factors, is
fense. An individual is not in the first instance punished because of whom he or she associates with in
the absence of criminal wrongdoing.
280
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 203 (Bradley ed., Vintage 1954) (1840).
281
28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012).
282
See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996).
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vulnerable to the charge that risk-assessments designate a blanket risk profile
to all members of a group and fail to identify the risk of recidivism for individuals within a group. Other considerations, however, mitigate these concerns
and would allow risk-assessments to make use of adult criminal history. First,
adult criminal history most reflects individual choice and what the individual
can control, as adult criminal history is based on criminal violations committed
with sufficient mental maturity. Second, individuals who have failed to bring
their conduct within the bounds of the law, despite past corrective action taken
by the criminal justice system, reveal themselves as particularly in need of additional help to make lawful choices. 285 Accordingly, adult criminal history
may be appropriately used for predictive purposes without punishing offenders
for traits outside of their control.
3. Traits That Undermine Individual Autonomy
The last overarching concern with risk-assessment tools is that they undermine the ability of individuals to exercise autonomy and develop over time.
Risk-assessments are in tension with individual autonomy for two reasons:
first, risk-assessments do not contemplate the ability of the individual to exercise choice and defeat his or her recidivism prediction; second, and arguably
worse, risk-assessments may authorize greater punishment and in doing so
make it less likely that the individual will be able to progress from the time of
sentence to the time of release. Indeed, Congress has recognized that the more
an individual is punished, the less likely the individual will rehabilitate.286 Accordingly, in supporting more stringent punishment, and thereby moving the
rehabilitative goalposts further out from the individual, risk-assessments may
actually facilitate the recidivism of the individual and simultaneously reinforce
the validity of recidivism statistics. This general concern does not depend on
the particular risk factor at issue and therefore applies to risk-based assessments as a whole.
As adult criminal history is the only factor that survives the previous
analyses, this Article addresses here only whether this factor adequately recognizes individual autonomy. People change over time—that much is undisputed.
As Pepper makes clear, an individual at release may be materially different
from that same person at sentencing. An individual who commits a crime at
age eighteen may be the same person in body and name at age thirty, forty, or
fifty, but may be someone else entirely in other respects.

285
See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980) (the state has a legitimate interest “in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply
incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law”).
286
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k).
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Criminal law reflects this potential for internal development. Take the
Sentencing Guidelines’ chapter on criminal history as an example. Pursuant to
this chapter, criminal sentences exceeding one year and one day that are more
than fifteen years old are not added to an offender’s criminal history points for
Guidelines calculation purposes.287 Nor are criminal sentences of at least sixty
days if those sentences are more than ten years old.288 Other criminal sentences
not covered by these two exclusions are not counted if they are more than ten
years old. 289 The reasons why these outdated sentences are not counted is rather simple: they do not accurately capture the individual’s current threat to
society, and an individual’s “desert” for prior crimes has grown stale. In other
words, the older sentences may not be indicative of the internal progress that
the offender has made over time.
Conduct that may have happened many years ago may be relevant if it is
similar to the type of conduct presently at issue. The Sentencing Guidelines,
for example, enable a judge to count these older sentences towards the offender’s criminal history if the older conviction is “similar” to the current offense. 290 The courts have taken an identical approach. In United States v.
Lucero, for example, a federal appeals court recognized that a defendant’s admission that he sexually touched his eight or ten year old nieces over thirtyfive years ago was relevant for purposes of sentencing for his child pornography convictions, despite the significant time that had passed. 291
But risk-assessment tools using adult criminal history may not make use
of these critical temporal and qualitative limitations. Take, as an example, a
widely-discussed November 2013 study. The study suggests that a riskassessment instrument consisting of factors related only to criminal history is
an accurate predictor of future criminal activity. 292 In the study, four statistically significant factors related to criminal history were used: 1) does the defendant have prior misdemeanor convictions, 2) does the defendant have prior felony convictions, 3) does the defendant have prior violent crime convictions,
and 4) is the defendant currently on probation/parole from a felony conviction? 293
This predictive tool, however, does not confine the adult criminal history
to convictions that are relevant either in time or type. For the usage of adult
criminal history to avoid encroaching on individual autonomy, risk-assessment
287
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tools may use adult criminal history only if there are temporal and qualitative
limitations akin to those found in the Sentencing Guidelines. The unqualified
use of adult criminal history does not contemplate the possibility that individuals may change over time and potentially reduce their threat to the public and
their need for moral “desert.” To punish individuals for their past actions,
without the requisite meaningful connection to those incidents, would have the
consequence of needlessly placing the offender in Zeno’s paradox and rendering his or her internal progress a more distant prospect.
Where does this analysis lead us? On the one hand, a judge can take into
account any and all factors in order to develop a sense of an individual’s future
dangerousness and determine whether and how long the individual should be
sentenced to prison or sent to a diversion program. On the other hand, a judge
can make these decisions according to the underlying offense for which the
individual was arrested or convicted, without regard to the offender’s characteristics.
In fact, neither of these extreme positions is viable. The former, judgecentric approach would invite the sort of subjectivity that facilitates sentencing
disparities and impressions of unfairness in sentencing. 294 The latter, offensecentric approach would be consistent with sentencing at the time of the founding, but would be inconsistent with modern sentencing’s preference for punishment to be tailored to the particularized circumstances at hand.295 This reality highlights the inherent tension between uniformity and individualization.
The proper balance must be found in the middle ground between the opposite
ends of the spectrum.
In an effort to find this middle ground, predictions of risk should include
only those factors over which the individual has actual or meaningful control,
and that reflect the possibility that the individual may change over time. Applied to seventeen major characteristics, all seventeen are problematic—yet
adult criminal history may be used with the proper temporal and qualitative
limitations. Utilitarian considerations, Supreme Court opinions, the SRA, and
Sentencing Guidelines all support these restrictions on actuarial predictive instruments.

294
See Robinson, supra note 78, at 20–21 (suggesting that the absence of any unifying principle
among the theories of punishment enables judges to cherry-pick theories that support a desired sentencing outcome).
295
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (“[T]he punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime . . . .”); cf. Koon, 518 U.S. at 113 (“It has been uniform and constant
in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes
magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.”) (emphasis added).
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B. Responses to Potential Counter-Arguments
This argument may provoke several critical responses, which this Article
will attempt to anticipate and mollify.
First, empiricists may argue that risk-assessment tools are a mechanism
by which to improve sentencing by replacing clinical or judicial intuition with
objective statistical data, allowing courts to reliably differentiate between lowrisk and high-risk offenders and allocate limited resources towards those who
need them most. Similarly, they may claim that the factors that this Article has
brushed aside are not only useful in this risk-prediction enterprise, but their
predictive value only enhances when the factors are used in the aggregate and
interact with one another.296
To this, this Article would remind the reader that the statistical superiority
of risk-assessment tools has been assumed here. Others already have praised
factors that this Article has discarded. 297 That is to say, this Article acknowledges that the factors reliably track risk, yet nonetheless diagnoses principled
problems with these factors, whether used in isolation or in some combination.
The statistical significance of the factors cannot be viewed in a vacuum—there
are legal and theoretical considerations that also must be taken into account.298
Put directly, the use of risk-assessment instruments in the criminal justice system must arise from the theories of punishment and the law, not simply be spit
out by a printer or entered on a database. This Article suggests that jurisprudential and legal considerations trump whatever statistical advantages may be
derived from the use of the problematic factors.
Second, some concerned with the “positive” promise of risk-based assessments—that they help the sentencer identify low-risk offenders who
should not be in prison, who should be in a prison for a shorter term, or who
should be sent to a diversion program—may argue that, under this Article’s
proposal, individuals will not be able to benefit from risk-assessment tools, and
instead will needlessly languish in prison without presenting any real risk of
recidivating, and that taxpayer dollars will be misallocated as a result. According to these critics, for every factor that is excluded, individuals who would be
high risk under that factor may be saved from the adverse consequences, but
individuals who may be low risk according to that same factor would lose out
296

See Coffee, supra note 23, at 1022–23 (“[W]e should look not at the isolated impact of a single criterion, but at the aggregate efficiency of all the criteria.”); see also Slobogin, supra note 26, at
125 (“[S]tatistical inference is individualized, or case-specific, in the sense that it predicts the chances
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297
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298
See Coffee, supra note 23, at 1013 (“Followed blindly, the goal of efficiency seems likely to
conflict eventually with the moral underpinnings of our criminal justice system.”).
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on favorable consequences stemming from the low risk score. They also would
observe that, in general, this Article has focused on the “negative” side of the
use of risk-assessment tools: their use to justify increased punishment, as opposed to their use to minimize punishment.
This Article accepts the charge as to the “negative” orientation of this Article. Some have stated already that predictive techniques should be used only
to reduce punishment and not enhance it. 299 Judge Wolff writes that “the severity of a punishment should not be based on a risk-assessment prediction.” 300
Another scholar writes that “actuarial tools are on firmer legal ground when
used as shields rather than as swords.” 301 The commentary to the draft revisions to the Model Penal Code similarly counsels “skepticism and restraint”
with respect to “the use of high-risk predictions as a basis of elongated prison
terms,” and endorses “the use of low-risk predictions as grounds for diverting
otherwise prison-bound offenders to less onerous penalties.”302 In reality, however, risk-assessments are not limited to sentence reduction; they remain open
to use for sentence enhancement. 303 As a result, the understandable preference
for the positive use of actuarial instruments does not eliminate the very real
possibility that these instruments may be used in both directions. 304
Moreover, considerations of individual control and social equity demand
a negative-centric approach. Whereas risk-assessment tools, left untouched,
would ostensibly enhance punishment for some and minimize punishment for
others, this Article suggests that only factors that reflect individual control and
choice should be included in risk assessment. If only those factors are included, all individuals would have a similar starting point in their risk score, and
any deviation from that starting point could be fairly attributed only to the
meaningful choices of the individual. In practical terms, it is true that this proposal would mean that a white, rich, educated person would not get the benefit
of the application of unmodified risk-assessment tools, which may, for example, counsel against pre-trial detention, for diversion programs, or for less prison time. It would mean, however, that a poor black person would not face pretrial detention, imprisonment, or a longer term of imprisonment due to irrele299
See David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1456 (2011).
300
Wolff, supra note 91, at 1405.
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Patton, supra note 299, at 1456 (quoting Margaret Etienne, Legal and Practical Implications
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302
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303
Starr, supra note 91, at 816 (“[T]he actual content of [the Model Penal Code’s proposed riskassessment provision] endorses incorporation of risk assessment procedures into sentencing guidelines, including for the purpose of increasing sentences.”).
304
Judge Wolff notes that the draft Model Penal Code “encourages the use of risk-assessment
instruments, especially”—but not exclusively—“to identify low-risk offenders who should be diverted
from prison.” Wolff, supra note 91, at 1406 (emphasis added).
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vant racial and wealth characteristics.305 In the end, this proposal means that,
for both of these people, their sentences would be adjusted on the basis of what
they have done (the instant offense) and what they have done in the past (their
relevant adult criminal history), not on characteristics unconnected to their actions. 306 In this sense, the values of individual choice in criminal law and equity are better served.307
Third, some may react to the concern that risk-assessment tools ascribe a
monolithic risk profile to individuals in a group by recommending a blended
approach that combines the actuarial and clinical models. Under this approach,
“Actuarial data could establish a ‘base rate’ for violent behavior for a population with given characteristics” and then clinical assessments would “discern
whether a member of this particular group diverged from the group norm because of characteristics not included in the statistical survey.” 308 This creative
approach is intuitively appealing, though it could only be applied to characteristics that are amenable to divergence (e.g., not race, national origin, sex, age).
Yet more fundamentally, this combined strategy seems to expose the unneeded
nature of risk-assessments: why not probe individual action directly instead of
determining whether the individual departs from the group? Moreover, even
those characteristics that can be changed in theory may still be problematic, as
adult criminal history unlimited by time shows.
Fourth, proponents of data-driven sentencing schemes may lament the
fact that copious statistical information would have little place in sentencing
under this Article’s proposal. That is not true. This Article suggests that the use
of actuarial instruments should be significantly circumscribed for purposes of
assessing risk and informing sentencing decisions on imprisonment. It would
allow, however, the use of predictive data to identify offenders’ needs and to
determine thereby what programs should be afforded to offenders to facilitate
their rehabilitation and reduce the likelihood that they will re-offend. 309 For
example, Attorney General Holder stated that “[d]ata can also help design
paths for federal inmates to lower [their] risk assessments, and earn their way
305
See Holder Remarks, supra note 28 (expressing concern that risk-assessment tools “may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society”).
306
Accordingly, to the extent that the controversy over actuarial risk-assessments is a proxy for
broader debates about whether liberty or equality should be the dominant objective in sentencing, this
Article does not select between the two, but pays tribute to both virtues.
307
See Eaglin, supra note 180, at 212 (suggesting that actuarial tools perpetuate a “misguided
focus” on only “low-level, low-risk offenders”).
308
Slobogin, supra note 26, at 110.
309
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s n.(a) (tentative draft No. 2, Mar.
25, 2011) (contrasting risk assessments, which “may be defined as predicting who will or will not
behave criminally in the future,” with needs assessments, which “may be defined as using predictive
methods to attempt a reduction in criminality through assignment to different treatments”) (citation
and internal citation marks omitted).
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towards a reduced sentence, based on participation in programs that research
shows can dramatically improve the odds of successful reentry.” 310 These approaches, he continued, “hold the potential to revolutionize community corrections and make our system far more effective than it is today,” including “by
better matching services with needs . . . .” 311 Two other senior government officials observed recently, “With today’s sophisticated assessment tools, we can
better sort offenders and match them with the levels of treatment and community supervision that offer the best chance for them to stay crime free,”312 a call
whose language corresponds with needs assessment.
Kansas offers a concrete example of how data may be re-purposed. Recidivism rates in the state dropped dramatically from fifty-seven percent in
2000 to thirty-three percent in 2013, in large part because Kansas has adopted
a mentoring program: the state uses data to identify offenders at risk for recidivism and then “matches community volunteers with prisoners who are within a
few months of getting out . . . .” 313 These mentors “help new parolees get mental health appointments, find work and ‘guidance to get through rough times,’”
according to the Kansas Department of Corrections Secretary. 314
Fifth, and relatedly, some may worry that this Article spells the return of a
rehabilitation-centric system in which indeterminate sentencing will be the
norm. These critics may recall that disparities in sentencing were a by-product
of a discretionary sentencing system. 315 Granted, this Article joins Congress in
advocating rehabilitation as a legitimate part of sentencing in the criminal justice system. ’Its approach would not, however, trigger unjustified disparities
because modern, rehabilitation-oriented sentencing would be guided by the
actual conduct of the individual.
Sixth, some may point to other risk-prediction innovations that do not rely
on such factors and ask what room there may be for these technological ad310
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vancements under this Article’s rubric. For example, a recent study suggests
that brain scans can accurately predict recidivism. 316 This Article would assert
that the use of these “biomarkers” in risk-assessments would be inappropriate
as they are not predicated on individual action, potentially punish the individual for that which the offender cannot meaningfully control, and presume that
the individual cannot act other than how his or her scans dictate. Otherwise,
sentencing would venture into “pre-crime” territory, 317 would break the link
between crime and action, and would undermine the autonomy of the individual. As Daskal suggests, these “restraints can only be justified by a purely deterministic view of individual action or a decision that respect for moral autonomy needs to give way to a different set of interests, such as protection of the
nation’s or community’s safety.” 318
Finally, actuarial tools have been quite helpful outside of the sentencing
arena, for example in detecting who may be prone to certain diseases and thus
take preventative health measures. 319 Some may ask whether the arguments in
this Article would question the use of actuarial tools for non-sentencing purposes. 320 The short response is “no.” This Article’s arguments regarding the
legality and propriety of actuarial tools are limited to the sentencing context.
Sentencing can be distinguished from other areas in which actuarial tools may
be applied because the use of actuarial tools here implicates whether the government may restrict the liberty of the individual.321 In other words, the application of actuarial methods in sentencing is qualitatively different than its use
in other aspects of society. Its collateral consequences, on employment and
potentially initiating a cycle of interacting with the criminal justice system, are
unique and especially debilitating as well.322
316
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CONCLUSION
Just as the Oakland Athletics were motivated by modest salary capabilities, the criminal justice community has recognized that its prisons are too
costly and crowded. Just as the A’s had little room for error and sought to minimize risk in its personnel decisions, the criminal justice community is interested in allocating its scarce resources efficiently and minimizing risk in who it
releases to the public. Just as the A’s needed to identify the potential stars
(whom the A’s would select or sign) from the potential duds (whom the A’s
would pass over), the criminal justice community needs to distinguish between
those individuals who pose a higher likelihood of recidivating (whom the system will assign greater attention) and individuals who present a smaller likelihood of re-offending (who would give the system less concern). Just as the A’s
turned to statistical evidence of past performance as the basis for projecting
which players would perform well in the future, the criminal justice system has
seized on actuarial methods for predicting which individuals may return to
criminal activity later on. Just as major league teams have incorporated statistical analyses in their personnel decision-making, states and scholars are embracing evidence-based sentencing practices.
At bottom, this Article has explored what happens when the starting point
for an analysis of risk prediction moves from the risk principle to the theories
of punishment. The risk principle, as noted by proponents of actuarial riskassessments, is the belief that “the level of correctional intervention should
match the client’s risk of recidivism.” 323 The theories of punishment, by contrast, suggest that the level of correctional intervention should flow from the
reasons why the state may legitimately impose punishment on an individual.
Those reasons dictate an alternative set of values that are in tension with the
pragmatic benefits of risk-assessment tools. To paraphrase The Wire’s Lester
Freamon, 324 you follow the risk principle, you get efficiency and empirical
support. But you follow the theories of punishment, and you get individual
action and agency.
This Article acknowledges the temptation to switch from a predictive system characterized as subjective and impressionistic to one that is purportedly
objective and evidence-based. Several states and the ALI are on board with this
transition. As the attraction of these tools increases, so does their reach over
criminal defendants, which numbered over twenty million in 2013 alone. 325
323
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For these offenders, their families, and their communities, the salience of these
tools matters in real terms because they can influence pivotal sentencing outcomes.
An excitement over the objective, evidence-based benefits of riskassessment tools may cause us to neglect whatever may tend to dampen the
legal viability of promising innovations. When those overlooked concepts are
of a fundamental order, and are in particular the very reasons why the state
may punish the individual, it is critical to restate their existence and revive
their consideration. This Article may help ensure that the stated benefits of evidence-based practices flourish, but, as they must, do so within bedrock legal
and principled limits.
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